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ABSTRACT 
The South African government has extended the constitutional mandate of the Auditor-
general to cater specifically for performance information in the public sector, which has 
resulted in the rollout of a Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation system 
designed to enhance efficiency, accountability and transparency in the public sector. 
This study investigated the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems 
that caused a majority of the North West provincial government departments to receive 
qualified opinion on performance information between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial 
years.  
A qualitative approach was used, supported by interviews and documentary analysis to 
extract rich data. The capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the 
provincial departments manifested themselves in the form of inadequate oversight role; 
poor leadership; malicious compliance; lack of approved M&E policies; lack of uniformity 
in M&E structure and location; lack of M&E skills, inadequate budget; lack of 
accountability and transparency. The overall conclusion of the study is that adequate 
oversight role and effective leadership, and political stability are central in the 
implementation process of M&E systems.  
Key recommendations of the study include amongst others capacitating the institutional 
oversight structures and leadership; approved M&E policies; streamline M&E systems; 
all programme managers should account for the M&E function; M&E systems should be 
fully resourced; and capacitate the M&E fora.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction 
In the current era, a result-based monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system, 
transparency and accountability are deeply embedded in the modern government 
systems.  This arises from the need for societies to exercise their democratic rights by 
holding governments accountable for conduct and performance. This trend includes the 
government of South African, which strives to integrate a results-based M&E system in 
its budget systems and operational plans as an attempt to ensure that limited public 
resources are channelled towards rendering basic services better and faster. Generally, 
a results-based M&E system is implemented as an instrument that can gauge the 
effectiveness and efficiency of government policies in terms of rendering public 
services.  
 
This thesis investigates the extent to which capacity gaps and systems problems in a 
result-based M&E system has compromised transparency and accountability in South 
Africa’s North West provincial government departments.  
 
1.2 Research topic and objectives of the study 
The research focuses its enquiry on the capacity gaps and systems problems in the 
M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments in relation to good 
governance. Good governance is an abstract concept that defines basic processes and 
procedures that should be followed as a measure to pursue effective service delivery 
and democracy. Governments, including the South African government, experience 
internal and external pressure as an outcome of communities, businesses and non-
governmental organizations that are increasingly becoming aware of issues that are 
related to good governance. As an outcome of this awareness, organisations demand 
that their governments become more accountable, transparent, effective and efficient in 
terms of service delivery. In order to promote transparency, accountability and to 
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improve performance, M&E at both strategic and operational levels has become 
increasingly important (Naidoo, 2011). 
A number of authors (see for instance Kusek and Rist, 2004; Mackay, 2006; World 
Bank, 2000) argue that the emphasis on result-based M&E systems is propelled by the 
need to promote transparency and accountability, thereby improving financial and non-
financial performance of modern governments. A number of developing countries, 
including South Africa and the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development 
(OECD) countries have taken a political stance to measure outcomes in order to 
improve performance and accountability (Brushett, 1998; Kusek and Rist, 2004; 
Mackay, 2006; World Bank, 2000).  
 
M&E became a key strategy within the SA government, and in 2010 the Department of 
Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation within the presidency was set up to drive it, 
and all government departments were required to set up M&E functions internally. The 
Department of Performance, M&E has been responsible for the development of policy 
frameworks and guidelines that are intended at supporting departments, municipalities 
and state owned enterprises to establish their own M&E systems.  In May 2014, the 
national departments were reconfigured as an attempt to streamline the departmental 
mandates mainly for improving the quality of service delivery. The then Department of 
Planning Commission and the Department of performance, M&E was reconfigured, and 
this gave rise to the establishment of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation that is led by Minister Jeff Radebe. 
 
Governments perceive result-based M&E systems as a tool that can measure their 
financial and non-financial performance. The World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the Common Wealth Learning, the Africa Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
are some of the organizations that have been instrumental in developing guidelines that 
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are aimed at building government capacity to establish and institutionalize their own 
M&E systems.  
 
“Without effective and accountable institutions, systems, processes and political will, 
economic gains are not automatically translated into development outcomes or 
registered as Millennium Development Goals (MDG) achievements” (UNDP, 2010: p15). 
Millennium Development Goals could be defined as the global partnership that has time 
frames and quantified targets that are aimed at addressing poverty in developing 
economies. The establishment of the government-wide M&E system (GWM&E) has been 
influenced by the result-based M&E guidelines that were developed by the above-
mentioned organizations.  
 
Although considerable progress is being made in achieving the set targets of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it has been found that the developing countries 
lack reliable statistics that could be applied to gauge their own developments (United 
Nations, 2013: p58). The South African government has established a government-wide 
M&E system as a measure to deliver on transparency and accountability as required in 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. For instance, the country requires 
adequate, accurate, reliable and verifiable information that can be used to develop 
policies and interventions to promote transparency and accountability in the organs of 
state. In an ideal situation, the Offices of the Premiers have a critical role to play in 
ensuring that their provincial departments and municipalities have the capacity to use 
the government-wide monitoring and evaluation (GWM&E) system to design their 
customized M&E system, but in reality certain departments struggle to institutionalize 
their M&E systems and the submission of accountability reports were not monitored 
(Auditor-general, 2014: p13) in the municipalities of the North West province.  
 
Monitoring is a systematic management tool that is applied during data management 
processes for the purpose of generating performance information that is accurate and 
reliable for decision-making processes (see The Presidency, 2007; Kusek and Rist, 
 4 
2004). The quality of data that has been collected, collated and analysed has a bearing 
on decisions that could be taken by the management and other major stakeholders. 
pertaining to the implementation of projects, programs, and policies.  
 
A result-based M&E system is a necessary tool that measures the effectiveness of 
internal management control systems, and when applied appropriately it could identify 
discrepancies between the utilised resources and the actual outputs. Monitoring is a 
data management process that is continuous in nature and its ultimate objective is to 
provide adequate, accurate, reliable and verifiable information that could be applied to 
influence decision-making processes (ibid).  
 
Evaluation is a system that is focused towards analysing the impact that is yielded by 
the projects, programs or policies. An effective result-based M&E system should enable 
end users to disaggregate performance information per government, ministry, and 
agency, manager and support staff with ease.  
 
South Africa is celebrating its twentieth year since the landmark 1994 elections, yet 
there are still organs of state that lack capacity in terms of M&E systems. For instance, 
in the North West provincial government there are entities and municipalities that 
operate without M&E Units, despite the requirement for all public institutions to have an 
internal control system for measuring performance. This lack could result in late or non-
submission of financial and non-financial performance information to the Office of the 
Auditor-general during audit process period.  
 
In terms of the Public Audit Act No. 25 of 2004 the Auditor-general of South Africa has 
the mandate to audit both financial and non-financial performance of all three spheres 
of government, namely the national, provincial and local governments as well as state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) on an annual basis. Late or non-submission of performance 
information defeats the Constitutional obligation of promoting transparency and 
accountability in the public service. “The value of M&E does not come simply from 
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conducting M&E or from having such information available; rather, the value comes 
from using the information to help improve government performance” (Mackay, 2007: 
p9).  
 
There is a need for an effective participatory or civic M&E system in the North West 
provincial government departments in order to achieve clean audit reports moving 
forward. Participatory M&E approaches occur when the government embarks on 
stakeholder consultation processes with the aim of improving performance, 
transparency and accountability. The nature of comments from such platforms allows 
government to fine-tune and strengthen its M&E systems. This M&E approach could be 
rolled-out in the form of M&E forums or customer satisfaction surveys. A civic M&E 
approach takes place when non-governmental actors judge the government based on 
its financial or non-financial performance using for instance annual reports, which could 
be used as evidence by the public to support or challenge the government. In the 
provincial context, there are departments, entities and municipalities that are not 
posting their annual reports on their websites, and this denies the general public their 
Constitutional right regarding access to public information.  
 
This research arises from the view that results-based M&E systems in the province have 
not yet matured to the level of participatory or civic approaches, and this could be 
attributed to the number of departmental M&E Units that lack capacity. The existence 
and effectiveness of the departmental M&E Units depends entirely on the level of 
support and commitment from the departmental management committee. Put into 
context, the departmental M&E reports that are ratified by management are minimally 
considered during the decision-making processes, meaning that reports are generated 
for compliance purposes.  M&E units that are not participatory by nature are restricted 
from publicising their M&E outcomes, as the existence and operation of such units is 
highly dependent on political will and operational mandate which is defined by the 
management of the department (Naidoo, 2011: p61).  
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1.3 Problem statement 
Between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years, more than half (Auditor-general, 
2013: p15) of the North West provincial government departments received qualified 
opinions on non-financial performance information. Failure to provide portfolios of 
evidence that is packaged per targeted performance indicator, and an inability to give 
reasons for deviations from the approved annual performance plans compromised the 
departments’ submissions. The Management performance assessment tool (MPAT) 
reports for the past two financial years also indicated that the North West provincial 
government departments failed to provide portfolios of evidence to corroborate the 
submitted information. 
The AG reports suggest that there is still a grey area in the provincial departments in 
terms of the oversight role that should be provided by the provincial leadership 
regarding data management processes. The reports further reveal that a majority of the 
provincial departments have developed a trend of submitting non-financial performance 
information that is inadequate, inaccurate and that could not be supported by portfolios 
of evidence.  For instance, it is contained in the annual report for 2012/13 financial year 
that the provincial departments could not account for 93 percent of major variances. 
The National Treasury Framework for Managing Performance Planning Information was 
designed to prescribe data management processes and procedures that should be 
followed during data collection, data packaging and data analysis. Lastly, the reports 
indicate that the provincial departments could not provide reasons for any disjuncture 
between their actual performance achievements and their annual performance plans. In 
terms of the National Treasury Guide and Framework of 2007, all auditees should 
ensure that in the process of preparing their annual performance reports they should 
always provide motivation for major variances between performance targets and the 
actual outputs; and such reports should also be supported by adequate and reliable 
corroborating evidence.   
 
 7 
This thesis provides background on the global principles and practices that have 
influenced the establishment of the framework for results-based M&E system. Secondly, 
the South African government’s modus operadi regarding the implementation of the 
government-wide M&E systems as a measure to pursue good governance will be 
investigated.  
 
1.4 Research purpose 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate capacity gaps and systems problems in the 
M&E systems that resulted a majority of the North-West Province departments not 
receiving clean audit reports on performance information between the 2010/11 and 
2013/14 financial years. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
What capacity gaps and systems problem in the monitoring and evaluation systems 
caused the majority of North West provincial government departments to receive 
qualified opinions on non-financial performance between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 
financial years?  
 
In order to resolve the main question, it will also attempt to resolve the following sub-
questions:- 
 
i. Do the North West provincial government departments have their own 
monitoring and evaluation policies in place? 
ii. Is M&E function incorporated in job descriptions of managers who are 
involved in data management processes? 
iii. Do the North West provincial government departments have capacity for 
monitoring and evaluation?  
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iv. Which internal control systems are in place for addressing deviations from 
annual performance plans? 
 
1.7 Structure of the research report 
 
The research report comprises six chapters that will take the following sequence. 
Chapter one is aimed at introducing the research topic and the field of study by giving a 
brief background on M&E systems in the North West provincial government 
departments. The literature review on M&E systems and good governance will be dealt 
with in the second chapter. Chapter three will focus on research methodology, and 
chapter four, on the research findings. The research findings will be analysed in chapter 
five. The last chapter will provide the recommendations and conclusions of the research 
report. 
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CHAPTER TWO  LITERATURE REVIEW2.1 Introduction 
With more opportunity to promote broad-based participation in development, there is 
increasing recognition that M&E should be participatory (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: 
p1). Therefore, there is a significant body of academic work from developed and 
developing countries including South Africa, that focuses on M&E systems as an 
instrument that is geared at promoting transparency and accountability (see Carlsson 
and Engel, 2002; Chelimsky, 2006; Engela and Ajam, 2010; Goldman et al., 2012; 
Gorgens and Kusek, 2010; Kusek and Rist; 2004; Mackay, 2007; Mayne, 2000; Patton, 
1997; Preskill and Russ-Eft, 2005). This chapter will take two-pronged approach: it will 
deal specifically with literature on M&E systems on the one hand; and good governance 
systems in the public sector on the other. The significance of the review is to reflect 
relevance and interconnectedness of the principles of good governance and M&E in 
decision-making processes in the modern government institutions.  
2.2 What is a M&E system? 
Increasingly around the world, participatory M&E is being used across a range of 
purposes and sectors (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p5). A results-based M&E system is 
interpreted and implemented differently by the public and private sectors. M&E  is 
described as management tool that could be applied to enhance performance of public 
and private sectors. “The value of M&E does not come simply from conducting M&E or 
from having such information available; rather, the value comes from using the 
information to help improve government performance” (Mackay, 2007: p9). The 
literature shows that an effective M&E system is a requirement for any organization that 
is results-based as a measure to enhance transparency and accountability.  
 
The OECD (2002a: p21 & 27) defines M&E as follows: 
“Monitoring is a continuous function that uses the systematic collection of data on 
specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing 
development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement 
of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds”. 
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“Evaluation is the systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed 
project, program, or policy, including its design, implementation, and results. An 
evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the 
incorporation of lessons learned into the decision making process of both recipients 
and donors”. 
 
2.3 Types of M&E systems 
Scholars have different views of what M&E means and what it is intended to achieve. 
For instance, the introduction of a results-based M&E system (Kusek and Rist, 2004: p 
xi) capacitates decision-makers in terms of measuring the actual outputs that have 
been derived from the applied limited resources; and the proponents of such  views 
within this spectrum are from those who perceive M&E system as supporting a pure 
accountability function (Naidoo, 2011:p41). The group that perceives M&E systems as 
supporting a pure accountability function is biased towards the field of auditing, 
compliance and performance management (Cooke, 2006). There are M&E systems that 
are aimed at promoting governance functions, thereby making government actors 
accountable for their performance. For instance, in the South African context, the 
Auditor-general, Public Service Commission and the general public have the 
Constitutional Rights to hold state organs accountable for poor service delivery.  Such 
state organs are judged based on the set standards and norms that have been attached 
to each and every performance area. Ultimately, the use and purpose of participatory 
M&E systems depends largely on the particular objectives and information needs of the 
project or programme initiative (UPWARD, 1997).  
 
Apart from M&E serving the very necessary purpose of accountability it also is meant to 
promote the “learning organization” (Naidoo, 2011: p42). Performance information that 
is derived from the M&E system should be objective in terms of identifying both the 
strengths and weaknesses of any institution that has been subjected to the system. 
Weaknesses that have been identified through the system should be prioritised for the 
sole purpose of converting them into the organisational gains. “The yardstick of success 
is the extent to which the M&E information is being used to improve government 
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performance” (Mackay, 2007: p2). Results-based M&E systems should not be viewed as 
an instrument that is applied to police the performance of employees; instead it should 
serve to reflect deficiencies between the organizational predetermined objectives and 
the actual performance. And therefore, deviations from the set standards and norms 
that have been exposed by a results-based M&E system warrant a remedial action 
(Mackay, 2007; Naidoo, 2011; Preskill and Russ-Eft, 2005).  
Application of evaluation system could be tedious considering that it is easily influenced 
by psychological, methodological and political factors. “These factors overlap, but what 
is clear is that unless all the elements are lined up, organizational learning is difficult” 
(Mayne, 2000: p29). A results-based M&E system does not operate in a vacuum, and 
therefore political, methodological and psychological factors that are related to the 
system should be streamlined as an attempt to produce adequate, accurate, reliable 
and verifiable information that would enhance the decision-making processes (Mayne, 
2000; Naidoo, 2011). Evaluation has the potential to allow organizations to learn from 
their unsatisfactory performance.  
A utility-focused M&E system (Patton, 1997) challenges M&E practitioners to raise 
questions about the entire data management processes including roles and 
responsibilities. M&E practitioners should be more concerned about the quality of data 
collected in relation to its relevance in decision-making processes, and they strive to 
generate information that would necessitate political principals to make informed 
decisions. Focus is mainly on the extent to which performance information that has 
been generated through the M&E system could enhance decision making processes. “A 
sound M&E system should not just improve compliance; it should also enhance the 
reflective capacity of organizations, whilst simultaneously increasing transparency, 
accountability and supporting a culture of learning” Engel and Carlesson, 2002. 
2.4 The evolution of M&E systems 
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Globally, there is an increased focus on M&E by donors, governments and non-
governmental organisations (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p3). There is growing interest 
in participatory M&E systems as a measure to counter more traditional top-down 
approaches to evaluation. Developing economies are characterised by inability to 
implement internal management systems that could be applied to measure the 
effectiveness of their policies, programs and plans; and therefore the establishment of 
an effective M&E system would be an insurmountable task for such economies.. The 
adoption of the MDGs has encouraged the developing economies to design and 
implement their own M&E systems as a measure to pursue good governance (see 
Kusek and Rist, 2004:p25; Mackay, 2007; Mkandawire, 2001).  
 
The focus on M&E system is influenced largely by factors such as the growth in the 
number and membership of national, regional, and global evaluation associations 
(Mackay, 2007: p9).  Global evaluation associations, including AfrEA, have stimulated 
the application of M&E systems moreover in the developing economies. For instance, 
AfrEA was geared at pursuing predetermined goals (World Bank, 2000: pxv) such as 
supporting national governments to establish M&E policies, institutionalization of M&E 
systems, and allocation of adequate resources for the implementation of the system. 
Lastly, AfrEA had the responsibility to establish structures that could be applied to 
familiarize end users with the development, requirements and usage of M&E systems. 
“Implementing a performance M&E system is an exercise in induced institutional 
innovation requiring mature consultation to strengthen and shape the demand for 
evaluation information” (Ruttan, 2006: p252).  
 
UNDP (2010: p15) claims that, “without effective and accountable institutions, systems, 
processes and political will, economic gains are not automatically translated into 
development outcomes or registered as MDG achievements”. Sustainability of M&E 
systems in developing economies requires unwavering support from the governmental 
and non-governmental actors. Financial and non-financial support is critical in the 
process of capacity-building for M&E systems in such economies. Governments of 
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emerging economies often lack the powers to deliver the required or requested policy 
results on their own (Hajer, 2003: p175), and therefore they operate on the basis of 
elaborate network relations (Foucault, 1980: p154-155).  
 
2.5 Context and purpose of M&E system 
 
The design of an M&E system needs to be contextual and needs to be designed fit-for-
purpose. Ideally, M&E system identifies problems timeously before they could cause 
more havoc in the organisation. Estrella and Gaventa (1997: p6) identified general 
functions of participatory M&E systems such as impact assessment and public 
accountability. Participatory M&E is mainly applied during impact assessment and 
project management processes.  
 
Traditionally, results-based M&E systems have been used by donor and government 
agencies to hold beneficiaries and programme recipients accountable to agreed goals of 
performance targets (Estrella and Gaventa 1997: p11). Participatory M&E system was 
applied to promote transparency and accountability thereby enabling the general public 
to evaluate the general performance of their governments. There needs to be a 
fundamental realignment of the relationship between donor and beneficiaries (Marsden 
and Oakley, 1990). In the United States, a citizen M&E approach has been applied to 
provide the communities an opportunity to hold government accountable and assess 
the extent to which public programmes satisfy citizen’s needs (Estrella and Gaventa 
1997: p12). Literature on community-based monitoring (Parachini and Mott, 1997) was 
aimed at building research and monitoring skills to capacitate the communities to make 
higher-level institutions and policy makers accountable for the quality of public service 
rendered. Such efforts could strengthen local capacities in terms of promoting public 
accountability and could also enable the communities to participate in policy-making 
processes.  
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In an ideal situation, a results-based M&E system should be integrated into the 
departmental or organizational budget and plans as a measure to promote transparency 
and accountability. While one purpose of participatory M&E may be to evaluate the 
impact of a plan over time, another may be to gain in timely and effective information 
which can be used for improving project planning and implementation (Estrella and 
Gaventa 1997: p8). Participatory M&E serves as an instrument that stakeholders could 
apply to analyse and reflect systematically on their experience, and to plan for future 
goals and activities (UPWARD, 1997: p10). According to Compos and Coupal (1996: 
p8), participatory M&E should provide information that could be applied to gauge the 
extent to which the organisational objectives have been attained as opposed to limited 
resources that were utilised. In Zambia, the participatory M&E system was designed 
mainly (Nagel et al., 1992) for the purpose of improving project management, 
comparing planned and actual achievements in order to suggest improvements for 
future planning and implementation.  
 
“It is also worth mentioning that M&E is not a policing function, but rather a catalyst for 
ensuring that  government resources are utilised in an effective and  efficient manner to 
meet or address the needs of  beneficiaries” (Mawelela, 2012 : p32). The South African 
government established the Public Service Commission for the purpose of enhancing 
accountability in the public sector pertaining to governance matters, and therefore M&E 
system is critical in this process. One of the major functions of participatory M&E 
systems is to create a learning process to strengthen organizational and institutional 
learning (Estrella and Gaventa 1997: p9). Participatory M&E systems serve as an 
integral component that necessitates relevant stakeholders to express their needs, 
interests and expectations. An M&E system should serve as an instrument that is 
geared at identifying internal management control systems that have the potential of 
derailing public and private sectors from attaining good governance thereby promoting 
accountability and transparency. 
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The existence of M&E system will be influence by both internal and external factors, 
and therefore it crucial for governments to scan the environment where the system 
would be established. An effective M&E system cannot be established overnight, and 
therefore a feasibility study should be conducted prior to the implementation process of 
the system. Kusek & Rist (2004: p41) state that, the readiness assessment is a 
diagnostic aid that will help where a given country stands in relation to the requirement 
for establishment of a results-based M&E system. “Despite positive developments, 
significant challenges remain in ensuring the coherence of reform initiatives conducted 
by central government departments, improving administrative data quality, and 
establishing M&E as a core role of management” (Goldman et al., 2012: p1).  
This section of the thesis could be summarized by stating that literature on participatory 
M&E system has proven that the system is applied in various contexts and settings, and 
it is also applied by different institutions to advance their different purposes. The usage 
and purpose of participatory M&E systems depends on the objectives of the M&E 
process itself.  
 
2.6 Establishment of M&E systems for improved support of governance 
 
There is a need to address capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E system for 
the North West provincial government departments to achieve clean audit report on 
performance information. Capacity building is a process that necessitates structures to 
establish and implement effective and efficient systems that have the potential to solve 
development problems over time (CIDA, 1996; Morgan, 1996; and UNICEF, 1996). Alley 
& Negretto (1999) suggest that capacity building is long term in nature; it contributes 
to socio-economic development, and is demand driven. 
 
“Nations have difficulty learning within their own contexts how to create appropriate 
roles for the state in development; how to organize and manage their systems so that 
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they can identify priority problems, formulate policies and create ways to have these 
policies implemented in a sustainable way” (Hiderbrand and Grindle 1994). On the other 
hand, Plaatjies (2011: p6) claims that a performance-oriented state has to review and 
where appropriate structure the capacity and organization to deliver on its constitutional 
and political service mandate. Capacity of any system revolves around the availability of 
the necessary resources such as budget, expertise, knowledge and information 
management, to mention but a few.  
 
M&E systems are at the centre of sound governance arrangements (Mackay, 2007: p2), 
and it is because they are necessary for the achievement of good governance. M&E 
system does not have a fixed structure; however there are critical steps to be followed 
in the establishment of the system. Critical steps in the establishment of results-based 
M&E system (Guijt, Arevalo and Saladores, 2001) include diagnosis of the existing M&E 
system; the development of action plan for M&E system; benchmarking on M&E 
system; and continued midcourse corrections. 
 
2.6.1 Diagnosis of the existing monitoring and evaluation system 
 
There is a need for governments to conduct diagnosis on their existing results-based 
M&E systems as a measure to determine their effectiveness. This approach has the 
potential of identifying the prevalence of strengths and/or weaknesses in their systems 
regarding the actual application of M&E information and quality of M&E reports. Guijt, 
Arevalo and Saladores (2001: p6) argue that there is great diversity of participatory 
M&E experiences, and the current rate of innovations will only add to that diversity.  
 
Participation of stakeholders in a results-based M&E process is still a challenge that 
appeals for immediate intervention by governments. Different indicators are applied for 
both the traditional and conventional M&E system, and lack of uniformity in such 
methodologies creates the level of uncertainties in governance. M&E principles and 
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practices that should be adopted by the public and private sectors have elements of 
advantages and disadvantages. Diagnoses of the existing M&E system is crucial for 
awareness campaigns and public participation processes. 
2.6.2 Benchmarking on monitoring and evaluation systems  
 
Much is already being claimed of participatory M&E systems, and this notion is 
challenged by Abbot and Guijt (1998) by arguing that too little is known about 
participatory M&E to confirm these claims. The establishment of any M&E system 
involves risks and therefore benchmarking process has the potential of minimising such 
risks. It is a fallacy that M&E system requires excessive Information Technology (IT) 
system and that the system guarantees adequate, accurate, verifiable and reliable 
information. Intensive usage of M&E information is the crux of the existence of any 
results-based M&E system. A results-based M&E system evolves with time, and 
therefore both the public and private sectors should embark on benchmarks as a 
measure to solicit best practices that are related to the system. 
 
In order to guard against inherent dangers, there seems to be broad agreement in the 
literature regarding the need for systematic and participatory procedures to monitor 
and evaluate the participatory M&E (PM&E) process itself (see CONCERN 1996; 
Feuerstein 1986; Rubin 1995; Scott-Villiers 1997a). A PM&E system (Estrella and 
Gaventa, 1997: p47) is a continuous process that updates and improves the process 
itself, or is a mechanism whereby participants can gauge whether they are obtaining 
the information they need, the techniques used are appropriately and the process as a 
whole is operating as planned. Results-based M&E systems, like any other internal 
control system, deserve to be regularly monitored and evaluated as an attempt to 
gauge their performance. Evaluations need to indicate not only what has worked and 
why, but also under what social, economic, and environmental conditions can a 
particular technology or innovation be replicated (McArthur, 1997: p22). Policies that 
regulate the application of results-based M&E systems should be reviewed constantly as 
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an attempt to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of such systems. The 
effectiveness of M&E system is measured in terms of the extent to which the M&E 
information is being used to improve government performance. 
 
2.7 Connection between M&E systems and good governance  
 
The nine values and principles that are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic are 
the South African definition of “good governance” (Public Service Commission, 2012: 
p9). The values and principles that are enshrined in the Constitution of the RSA, Act 
108 of 1996 include high standard of professional ethics; promotion of efficient, 
economic and effective use of resources; public administration must be development-
oriented; public services should be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without 
bias; people’s needs must be responded to, and public participation process should be 
encouraged; public administration should be accountable; transparency should prevail 
in the public administration; good human resource management and career 
development practices should be cultivated; and public administration should be 
representative of the South African people.  
 
Good governance is the ability of the government to improve the general welfare of the 
people in a transparent and accountable manner. The emphasis on M&E systems is 
driven (Dumela, 2013: p4) by the need to: promote good governance; improve 
government’s performance and public accountability; comply with international donor 
funding requirements; achieve the millennium development goals; and respond to 
economic and social pressures experienced by countries. The M&E function that has 
been undertaken by the Public Service Commission has supported democracy by 
ensuring that the public sector becomes accountable and transparent pertaining to the 
utilization of public resources.  Evidence-based decision-making has gained momentum 
over the years, and therefore the results-based M&E system should produce 
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performance information that is accurate and reliable for the enhancement of effective 
management.   
 
Many people do not give thought to why they are participating in M&E and simply 
accept that a project has been designed for them by someone else (Scott-Villiers, 
1997a: p3). Involving a greater number of actors in PM&E (Armonia and Campilan, 
1997: p20) may have implications for changing or reinforcing power relations among 
them, especially with respect to the influence with donors and implementing agencies 
traditionally hold over the M&E process. “At a broad level, M&E in pursuit of good 
governance should lead to discernable changes in the manner in which government is 
managed, and services experienced by citizens” (Naidoo, 2011, p20). An effective M&E 
system should strive to promote three pillars of good governance such as transparency, 
accountability and learning. The cumulative effect of M&E should strive to enhance two 
key pillars of good governance such as transparency and accountability. In the quest to 
determine the objectives of M&E system, one must know who the actors are in the 
process, and who the end-users will be, why the project is to be carried out, and how 
the results and processes are to be used (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p28). 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between good governance and M&E 
 
Source: Naidoo (2011:35) 
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Figure 1 depicts that institutions apply M&E system as a tool that is geared at 
promoting transparency and accountability. The figure further shows that good 
governance is an ideal outcome that can manifest itself in the form of adequate 
transparency and accountability regarding the quality of public service rendered vis-à-
vis resources consumed. Chelimsky (2006: p54) suggests that the results-based M&E 
systems should serve as a unifier of all systems that are aimed at rendering quality 
services to the public. In an ideal situation, transparency and accountability cannot 
prevail in the absence of an effective M&E system. If a results-based M&E system is 
implemented poorly or inappropriately, time and resources may go to waste and 
problems may go unnoticed, subsequently hindering project performance and 
community building (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997: p47). 
 
Figure 2: Support for good governance 
 
Source: Naidoo (2011:p36) 
 
Figure 2 above shows that aspects such as explicit policies, accessibility of public 
documents, accountable budget processes, entrenched performance management 
systems, effective internal control systems, effective M&E system, and public 
participation are the key pillars of good governance. Participatory M&E is unique from 
conventional M&E system mainly because it necessitates participation of both the 
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governmental and non-governmental actors in the process. Feuerstein (1996) describes 
the essential feature of PM&E as a ‘real partnership in development’ whereby people 
are involved in deciding when and how to monitor and evaluate, analyse, communicate, 
and use information. An effective policy can serve as a stimulus towards other internal 
control systems of any organisation be it public or private, and therefore there is a need 
to promote public participation in policy-making processes.  
 
Figure 3: Basis for M&E effectiveness 
 
Source: Naidoo (2011:p36) 
 
Figure 3 above is illustrates basic components of an effective M&E system, and they 
include amongst others, transparent and accountable environment; promotion of 
pluralistic M&E approaches, M&E capacity building and support; and M&E utility evident. 
The prevalence of such basic components of effective M&E system has the potential of 
promoting good governance. Apart from M&E needing to be properly institutionalized 
(Mackay, 2006), it is crucial to empower the operators of the system with the required 
M&E skills. An effective M&E system is ideally required for the purpose of generating 
accurate, reliable and verifiable information that could be applied in decision-making 
processes. “The M&E system provides the information needed to assess and guide the 
project strategy, ensure effective operations, meet internal and external reporting 
requirements, and inform future programming” (Chaplowe, 2008: p3). Information that 
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is generated through a results-based M&E system should enable relevant stakeholders 
to take informed decisions and actions regarding service delivery. 
 
2.8 M&E systems in the South African context 
 
Engela and Ajam (2010: p30) argue that the South African government institutions are 
characterised by a culture of malicious compliance regarding performance reporting. On 
the other hand, Plaatjies (2011: p1) retorts that while there is a public discourse on the 
overall nature and extent of performance by the state in delivering on its constitutional 
mandate, the public discourse is devoid of a broadly supported, systematic and 
transparent performance M&E system.  There is a general outcry in South Africa that 
the rollout process of a results-based M&E system has not yielded the desired results 
yet, and this could be ascribed to a lack of capacity in the public sector  (see Engela 
and Ajam 2010; Plaatjies 2011; Chelimsky, 2006). The general public does not have full 
confidence and trust on the quality of the government reports that have been 
generated through the M&E system and this could be attributed to their minimal 
participation in data management processes. Within a context where information is 
readily shared (Castells, 1999), the general public participate voluntarily in public 
debates that are geared at enhancing government policies. The country’s problems in a 
results-based M&E systems are compounded by the fact that the system is not aligned 
to strategic plans and budget. In an ideal situation, M&E systems should form an 
integral part of the internal management control systems for the enhancement of 
service delivery.  
 
It should be acknowledged that the existence of any internal management control 
system, including the M&E, revolves around political factors, and therefore such factors 
cannot be down played during the establishment of the results-based M&E systems. 
“While much progress has been made in understanding how institutions affect political 
actors, preferences, and public policy, we have little understanding of the process of 
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institutional change” (Tolbert, 2003: p467). The application of M&E system is equally 
important to the politicians, government administrators and the general public in the 
sense that it generates performance information that could be applied to inform socio-
economic decisions. The modern South African government is more result-driven, and 
the establishment of the government-wide M&E system serves as a reference. In 
directing efforts to improve capacity (Plaatjies, 2011: p4), modern governments have to 
think in terms of the institutional arrangements they need to use. Improvements in one 
or more performance measures are realized only at the sacrifice of others’ and the 
resulting institutional structures reflect this (Williamson, 1985: p408). In the South 
African context, the government-wide M&E system was introduce as a means to 
measure performance of the government in terms of limited resources used against the 
quality of service delivery.  
According to President Zuma (2009: p11),  
 
South Africa is a developmental state, which requires the improvement of public services and 
strengthening of democratic institutions. The government has established the Ministry for 
Planning, M&E in the Presidency as a measure to strengthen strategic planning, as well as 
performance M&E. The President emphasizes that to ensure delivery on the government 
commitments; the Ministry will hold Cabinet Ministers accountable through performance 
instruments, using established targets and output measures. He further states that the 
government will also involve State-owned enterprises and development institutions in 
government planning processes and improve the M&E of their performance.  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes provision for the establishment 
of independent institutions such as the Auditor General of South Africa, the Office of the 
Public Service Commission, the Office of the Public Protector, the National Parliament, 
and Provincial Legislatures as a measure to promote transparency and accountability in 
the public sector. The establishment of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation in the Presidency was not only geared at enhancing the structural and 
functional importance of M&E, but it is also geared at removing this function from line 
functions and ministries. The South African government has given the results-based 
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M&E system the necessary prominence it deserves thereby establishing the policy 
framework that regulates the system. 
 
Since 1994, the South African government has strived to ensure that public resources 
that are limited in nature are utilized optimally, which is why the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA) (199), the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) (2003), 
and the Public Service Act (PSA) (1994 as amended) were promulgated. Section 32 of 
the Constitution of the RSA, ACT 108 of 1996 states that “members of the Cabinet are 
accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers 
and the performance of their functions”, and that they must “provide Parliament with 
full and regular reports concerning matters under their control”. Section 133 provides 
for accountability of members of executive council of a province to the provincial 
legislatures. Municipalities are held accountable in terms of the Municipal Structures Act 
of 1998. These public sector management reforms derive support from other policy 
initiatives and legal requirements that are aimed at enhancing control over public 
expenditure and empowering public sector managers. The existence of any institution 
be it private or public, relies largely on the effectiveness of its internal control systems. 
A M&E system, like any other internal control systems, does not operate in a vacuum, 
and therefore the South Africa government has designed the frameworks and guidelines 
within which the M&E system should operate. “In South Africa there is a wide range of 
regulatory sticks that should encourage the use of evaluative information” (Plaatjies, 
2011: p21).  
 
Goldman et al. (2012: p1) state that the Constitution mandates that the Auditor-general 
and the public service commission carry out independent monitoring of certain aspects 
of government and report on this to parliament. The country’s M&E system is regulated 
in terms of policy frameworks such as GWM&E system; the role of Premiers’ offices in 
GWM&E: a good practice guide; DPME guidelines; framework for managing programme 
performance information; South African Statistical Quality Assurance Framework; and 
the national evaluation policy framework. The government established the policy 
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framework for the government-wide M&E system to support and capacitate all three 
spheres of government in the institutionalisation of their own M&E systems; and the 
precautionary measures should be observed in the establishment of the system. Ideally, 
all three spheres of government should ensure that M&E initiatives are established on 
the basis of the public sector management, budget, accounting and performance 
management reforms. “How managers manage likely makes a difference in the 
programme outcomes that our agencies achieve, and may also help build the 
connections that make democracy stronger and keep citizens engaged” (Berry, 2010: p 
S154).  
 
2.9 Good governance 
 
Good governance requires the enhancement of public participation in the processes that 
are geared at making and implementing policies that will promote efficiency in the 
government institutions (Peters, 2011; and Grindle, 2007). Transparency and 
accountability are major yardsticks that could be applied to measure the level of 
efficiency in the public sector.  
 
2.10 The origin of good governance 
 
Morrell (2006b) claims that the origin of governance lies in the Greek term kybernesis 
(piloting). In the Western governments Good governance and democracy received 
recognition in the 1980s, and it was only in 1989 that the contemporary notion of good 
governance was officially embraced (Leftwich, 1994; and the World Bank, 1989). The 
concept of good governance was introduced by African scholars, but the concept was 
later owned by the developed economies for the manipulation of policies of the 
developing economies (Mkandawire, 2007; and Leftwich, 1994). “For African 
contributors, good governance related to the larger issues of state-society relations and 
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not just to the technocratic transparency-accountability mode that it eventually 
assumed in the international financial institutions” (Mkandawire, 2007: p681).   
2.11 Structural adjustment versus good governance in the African 
Continent 
The current Western policies are mainly aimed at capacitating the developing 
economies in their quest to establish and implement internal management control 
systems such as M&E as a measure to promote transparency and accountability. The 
Western governments’ interest in good governance is based on key external forces 
amongst others structural adjustment lending. Structural adjustment approach was 
aimed at declaring the internal management systems of poor countries redundant and 
as the result defeating the objectives of good governance (Lancaster, 1993; and the 
World Bank, 1991)  
Structural adjustment was deliberately applied by the Western governments to enforce 
good governance. “Western governments regularly provided systematic economic, 
political and military aid for authoritarian regimes such as Argentina, Chile under 
Pinochet, Iran and South Korea, as well as some of the least liberal, most corrupt or 
straightforwardly incompetent governments, such as Iraq, Zaire, Haiti and much of sub-
Saharan Africa” (Barya, 1993: p18). 
2.12 Levels of good governance 
The concept good governance has three different levels of meanings such as systematic 
good governance, political good governance, and administrative good governance 
(Leftwich, 1993). The author further suggests that the concept good governance could 
be associated with the World Bank pertaining to administrative and managerial terms or 
it could be associated politically with the Western governments.  
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2.12.1 Systemic good governance 
Systemic good governance is a democratic system of political and socio-economic 
relations, and the system requires a minimal role from the government (Chalker, 1991: 
p2-3; House of Commons, 1990: 1235-1299; Leftwich, 1993).  
 
2.12.2 Political good governance 
Like in South Africa, power between the legislative, executive and judicial structures are 
clearly spelt out under political good governance system. Political structures or 
authorities, irrespective of their status in the societal environment, play a critical role in 
decision-making processes that are aimed at enhancing the general well being of the 
general public (Tolbert, 2003; and Easton, 1965b).  
 
2.12.3 Administrative good governance 
Administrative good governance is a form of system that is characterized by efficient, 
independent, accountable and open public service (Leftwich, 1993). Certain 
governments of emerging economies have inadequate political will and technical 
capacity to provide public services effectively and efficiently, and therefore their 
existence depends largely on networks (Foucault, 1980; Mkandawire, 2001: p291). 
There is no government that can operate in a vacuum, meaning that governmental 
actors, non-governmental actors, and internal control systems are crucial in ensuring 
that basic quality services are being rendered to the general public. For instance, the 
South African government often applies contracting-out methods as an attempt to 
render basic public services more efficiently. Institutions literally use networks in their 
endeavour to implement their policies as a measure to provide services better and 
faster (Innes and Booher, 2003; Tansey, 1996). 
 
Both the public and private sectors strive to integrate their governance systems to their 
customised M&E system as a measure to derive maximum outputs by exploiting limited 
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resources that are at their disposals. The sectors desire to be as accountable and 
transparent as possible to their beneficiaries and therefore M&E systems come handy 
for this desire to be attained. “Other benefits of effective M&E are supporting policy 
making and decision-making processes; helping government ministries and agencies to 
manage activities at sector, programme and project level; enhancing transparency; and 
promoting accountability” (Dube, 2013: p25). 
 
2.13 Governance in the African Continent 
 
The Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) share a common vision and this could be ascribed to their 
primary objective of promoting good governance in the continent. The creators of 
NEPAD were aware of previous false starts and well-intentioned African initiatives and 
the reasons they had failed and were determined to redeem and rectify past mistakes 
and bad governance, and assume African ownership and leadership, responsibility and 
accountability in ensuring that the basic needs, demands and aspirations of the people 
were catered for (ECA, 2011: p52). The African conditions were further compounded by 
the inappropriate policies pursued by the first and subsequent generations of African 
leaders, lack of implementation, corruption, mismanagement and bad governance.  
 
African leaders took full control of the government of their countries and this was after 
countries gained their independence from the rich and powerful economies. Such a 
transition necessitated that African governments were recognized as legitimate 
institutions that possess the necessary capacity to promote economic growth and 
development in the continent. Traditional governance systems barred the ordinary 
people from participating in decision-making processes and this was tantamount to 
autocracy. Governance – let alone good governance – was not in the political or 
bureaucratic vocabulary of those who were in power and authority in Africa, and 
constitutions were not always respected, laws were often disregarded; accountability 
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was scarcely acknowledged, and transparency and access to information were restricted 
(ECA, 2011: p54). There is a drastic paradigm shift on how the modern African leaders 
think and act. The mind-sets of the African leaders have been shifted from government 
to governance in the sense that traditionally their focus was mainly on governing and 
ruling the people. The modern African governments are democratically elected and the 
constitutions of their respective countries are characterized by transparency and 
accountability.  
 
2.14 Factors hampering a good governance system 
 
A good governance system could be hampered by factors such as the application of 
modern technology that make the modern society more difficult to be steered (Pierre 
and Peters, 2005). There is prevalence of inadequate sources of revenue and the lack 
of capacity to develop policies in the poor countries, and this has the potential of 
compromising elements of good governance. In the context of South Africa, the 
application of modern technology enhances public participation in decision-making 
processes, and it also necessitates non-governmental actors to access government 
documents online with ease. Bang and Esmark (2009: p13) argue that the society 
moves from mass media systems to more user-oriented and fragmented multimedia 
systems that are increasingly digitized and interactive.  
 
It is stated by Painter and Pierre (2008) that the complaints about governance failures 
and governance capacity have been voiced in a wide variety of governments, especially 
in the developing democracies. Government failures are political in nature, and as a 
result they necessitated external pressure for the revitalization of traditional forms of 
governance. New Public Management (NPM) was established on the basis of ensuring 
that governments become steering-oriented thereby crafting policies that should be 
implemented by agencies on their behalf as measure to expedite the processes of 
rolling-out public services. New Public Management has been designed in such a way 
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that when its programs are implemented correctly they will yield the desired positive 
outcomes. “During the governments of the 1960s and 1970s, there was an emphasis on 
comprehensive evaluations of public policies, and currently the general strategy for 
assessment has shifted toward more short-term performance management” (Peters, 
2011: p7). 
 
In the South African context, the New Public Management (NPM) reforms were mainly 
applied for decentralising authority and responsibility to managers. Naidoo (2011: p21 
that in today`s democracy), it would be difficult for government to deny the potential 
and power that performance results have over government, irrespective of where it 
stems from. New Public Management has necessitated performance information to have 
a direct bearing on decision-making processes in the public sector. Performance 
information has influence on socio-economic and political factors, and therefore the 
establishment of an effective M&E system is critical for generating credible information.  
 
2.15 Conclusion 
 
An effective M&E system is a prerequisite for good governance. Concise and 
unambiguous policy frameworks and guidelines that are related to a results-based 
mentoring and evaluation systems should be crafted and be enforced by the modern 
governments. Capacity building in terms of a results-based M&E system needs to be 
intensified as an attempt to keep managers in government institutions abreast with the 
latest best practices regarding the system. The North West provincial government 
departments should expedite the process of capacitating their M&E directorates thereby 
crafting their own M&E policies that are synchronized to the relevant national policy 
frameworks and guidelines. A sound political willingness is critical in the establishment 
of a well capacitated M&E system. 
 2.16 Conceptual framework 
Table 1: Conceptual framework 
Key issues/ 
themes 
Authors Research questions Relevance of the 
research 
questions 
Purpose 
Accountability UNDP (2010) Who, in terms of seniority, is responsible for 
ensuring quality assurance during the following data 
management processes?  
Public 
accountability 
Promote 
accountability.  
Transparency Naidoo (2011) What do you believe are the real causes of under-
performance or over-performance on non-financial 
information in the North West provincial 
government departments?  
Systems problems Promote 
transparency 
Institutionalised 
M&E 
Goldman (2012) Do the provincial government departments possess 
their own M&E policies? 
Institutionalization 
of the GWM&E 
systems 
Political 
intervention 
Malicious 
compliance 
Engela & Adams (2010) What capacity gaps and systems problem in the 
M&E systems caused the majority of North West 
provincial government departments to receive 
qualified opinions on non-financial performance 
between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years?  
Compliance Promote 
compliance 
Capacity in M&E Guijt, Arevalo and 
Saladores (2001) 
Which interventions could be applied to address 
deficiencies in the departmental Monitoring & 
Evaluation Unit? 
Capacity gaps & 
systems problems 
Capacity 
building in 
M&E 
Participatory M&E Estrella & Gaventa 
(1997) 
What is the current status of personnel that is 
attached to the departmental Monitoring & 
Evaluation Unit? 
M&E specialists Resourced 
M&E Unit 
Purpose of M&E Kusek & Rist (2004); 
Naidoo (2011); & Patton 
(1997) 
How is M&E system connected to good governance? Integrated 
planning 
Promote 
integrated 
planning 
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CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the methodology used for the study, “and justifies the research 
methods and choices by presenting a justifiable and objective research process which is 
pivotal to answering the research questions” (Babbie and Mouton, 2006: p75). Research 
methodology is a systematic method that is applied by researchers to explain, explore 
or describe a particular matter that is being researched. The researcher is mindful of 
the fact that qualitative and quantitative research methodologies differ in nature. 
Qualitative and quantitative research methodologies are equally important, and their 
application depends purely on the research objective.  In this thesis, qualitative 
research methodology was applied to investigate the prevalence of deficiencies in M&E 
systems in the North West provincial government departments between 2010/11 and 
2013/14 financial years.  
Qualitative research is a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than 
numbers as a measure to extract meaning from what is being observed or studied 
(Bryman, 2012: p380; Maree, 2011: p50). “The methodology is characterized by its 
aims, which relate to understanding some aspect of social life, and its methods which 
(in general) generate words, rather than numbers, as data for analysis” (Patton and 
Cochran, 2007: p1); and “it studies people or systems by interacting with and observing 
the participants in their natural environment (in situ) and focusing on their meanings 
and interpretations” (Holloway and Wheeler, 1996). Relevant research methods such as 
interviews and documentary analysis were applied in this thesis to investigate the 
capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial 
government departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. The approach 
was appropriate in terms of addressing both primary and secondary research questions 
of this thesis. 
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The thesis describes, interprets, verifies or evaluates decisions or actions that were 
taken by a particular targeted population pertaining to matters that are related to 
results-based M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments. 
Qualitative research methodology was applied because the emphasis of the research 
project was mainly based on the quality and depth of information as opposed to the 
scope or breadth of information provided as in quantitative research. The methodology 
necessitated the researcher to interact physically with the relevant interviewees during 
data collection process, and such exercise was beneficial to the researcher considering 
the fact that it enabled him to tighten loopholes during the process by posing follow up 
questions.  
 
3.2 Research design 
Research design is a framework or structure that provides guidance about all facets of 
the study regarding the execution of a research method and the data analysis the 
researcher conducts (see Creswell, 2002; Leedy and Ormrod, 2010; Bryman, 2012). 
Research design serves as a framework within which the researcher operated during 
data collection and data analysis processes. Internal and external stakeholders were 
identified to serve as a sample in the process of investigating the prevalence of capacity 
gaps and systems problems in M&E system in the North West provincial government 
departments. Interviews and documentary analysis were applied as research 
instruments for investigating capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E in the 
provincial departments.  
3.2.1 Sampling 
The term sample is described as the segment of the population that that has been 
selected in a systematic manner for a particular investigation and this measure ensures 
that the community/users/external actors see the process as free, fair and credible 
(Bryman, 2012(Patton & Cochran, 2007: p11). This research applied purposive sampling 
to identify both internal and external stakeholders that were interviewed during the 
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data collection process. Purposive sampling was applied mainly because that targeted 
population had the potential to provide basic information that could be beneficial to this 
thesis. Purposive sampling method was implemented considering the fact that the 
primary goal of the thesis is to describe capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E in 
the North West provincial government departments. Accessibility, consent and level of 
responsibility of officials in terms of data management processes in the North West 
provincial government departments were applied as criterion to identify the targeted 
people for the study. 
 
Table 2: Demographics of interviewees 
Interviewee 
Number 
Gender Employer Designation Experience 
in M&E 
Function 
Date of 
Interview 
1 Male Provincial Internal Audit 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
+ 10 years 1/12/14 
2 Male Office of the Premier Director: M&E + 5 years  1/12/14 
3 Male Department of Health 
Director: Policy, 
Planning, Research & 
M&E 
+ 5 years 
 2/12/14 
4 Female 
Department of 
Planning, Monitoring & 
Evaluation 
Director: M&E 
+ 5 years 
 4/12/14 
5  Male 
 Auditor General of 
South Africa 
 Audit Manager  + 5 years  17/12/14 
6  Male 
 Department of Sport, 
Arts and Culture 
 Acting Director: 
Strategic 
Management 
 + 5 years  12/01/15 
7  Female 
 Department of Public 
Works, Roads & 
Transport 
 Director: M&E  + 5 years  16/01/15 
8  Male 
 Department of 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
 Director: M&E  + 5 years  27/01/15 
9  Male  Department of Finance  Director: M&E  + 5 years  30/01/15 
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3.2.2 Data Collection 
The use of qualitative methods requires data that is primarily in the form of words, not 
numbers (Patton and Cochran, 2007: p13). This research applied research methods 
such as documentary analysis and interviews during data collection process as a 
measure to investigate capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E systems in the 
North West provincial government departments. The researcher chose documentary 
analysis and interviews as data collection techniques mainly because they could 
supplement and verify data that has been omitted, for instance; data that was missed 
through documentary analysis was collected through interviews and vice versa. 
3.2.3 Documentary Analysis 
“The use of document data refers to the process of using any kind of documents, films, 
television programmes and photographs, as well as written sources for analysis in 
relation to a particular research question” (Saeidi, 2002: p59). Any information that has 
been documented that is relevant to the results-based M&E system will be considered 
during data collection process. Saeidi (2002) claims that primary sources of data are 
described as data that is unpublished (but may also be in published form, like a letter in 
a newspaper or a company report) and which the researcher has gathered from the 
participants or organizations directly. Relevant documents were analysed as an attempt 
to identify elements of capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E systems in the 
North West provincial government departments. 
 
In terms of the Constitution of the RSA, Act No. 108 of 1994, the Auditor-general of 
South Africa is an independent body that has been mandated to audit both financial and 
non-financial performance information in a fair, objective and transparent manner. The 
researcher had therefore delved deeper into the Auditor-general’s opinion regarding 
non-financial performance of the provincial departments. The following annual reports 
on the North West provincial audit outcomes were analysed, and the focus was on the 
targeted departments such as Sport, Arts and Culture; Social Development; Health; 
Public Works, Roads and Transport; and the Office of the Premier: 
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 [General report on provincial audit outcome for 2010/11 financial year]. 
 [General report on provincial audit outcome for 2011/12 financial year]. 
 [General report on provincial audit outcome for 2012/13 financial year]. 
 [Genera report on provincial audit outcome for 2013/14 financial year]. 
“Management performance assessment tool (MPAT) is a tool that benchmarks good 
management practice; and such tool does not duplicate existing monitoring and 
oversight by other departments, and in fact draws on secondary data from these 
entities to review the self-assessments of departments” (The Presidency, 2012: p4). 
The following management performance assessment tool reports of the North West 
provincial government departments were also analyzed to gauge non-financial 
performance information of the targeted provincial departments: 
 [Management performance assessment tool report for 2011/12 financial year]. 
 [Management performance assessment tool report for 2012/13 financial year]. 
Various relevant sources that are relevant to the capacity of a M&E systems in the 
North West provincial government departments were analysed:- 
 [The Constitution of the RSA, act No 108 of 1996]. 
 [Policy Framework for the Government-wide Monitoring & Evaluation Systems of 
2007].  
 [The Premiers’ role in the government-wide M&E systems: guideline]. 
 [Department of performance, M&E guidelines]. 
 [The departmental monthly and quarterly performance information reports]. 
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3.2.4 Interview 
Interviews differ from everyday conversations because researchers are concerned to 
conduct them in the most rigorous way in order to ensure reliability and validity (Patton 
and Cochran, 2007: p130). Interview is a tool that the interviewer applies to cross 
question an interviewee during data collection process. The researcher was mindful of 
the fact that qualitative interview should extract rich descriptive data, and that it should 
see the world through the eyes of the participant. The researcher ensured that 
qualitative interview become objective thereby developing an interview schedule that 
was geared at promoting credibility and transparency respectively.  
 
A sizable number of the North West provincial government departments such as 
Provincial Treasury; Sport, Arts and Culture; Public Works, Roads and Transport; 
Health; Agriculture and Rural Development; and the Office of the Premier constituted 
the North West component of the selection of interviewees, and they represented about 
half of the number of the provincial government departments. Secondly, the researcher 
identified the North West Provincial internal audit, the office the Auditor-general, and 
the Department of planning, M&E as external stakeholders that participated in interview 
sessions that were geared at extracting more information regarding the capacity gaps 
and systems problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial government 
departments. Both the internal and external stakeholders were selected based on their 
consent to participate in the exercise, their relevance to the research project, 
availability of their reports on non-financial performance information, and their 
accessibility.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted as a measure to ensure that the collected 
data becomes reproducible, systematic, credible and transparent. “Semi-structured 
interviewing is perhaps the most common type of interview used in qualitative social 
research; and in this type of interview, the researcher wants to know specific 
information which can be compared and contrasted with information gained in other 
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interviews” (Dawson, 2002: p28). Patton & Cochran (2007: p13) claim that qualitative 
interview is reproducible when someone else could use the same topic guide to 
generate similar information.  
 
The researcher strived to maintain a balance between uniformity and flexibility during 
data collection process, and it was against this backdrop that two schedules of semi-
structured interviews were designed. The ‘internal interview schedule’ (to be used for 
the North West interviews), is included as Appendix A. This interview schedule was 
geared at soliciting information from the accounting officers and senior managers who 
are directly in charge of M&E units in the targeted North West provincial government 
departments. Accounting officers and senior managers who are attached to M&E 
directorates of the targeted provincial departments are critical in the data collection 
process. They have the function of ensuring that non-financial performance information 
undergoes a quality assurance process before it is submitted to the department of 
finance; department of performance, M&E; and the Auditor-general for compliance and 
audit purpose.  
 
Appendix B contains the schedule for interviews of the external stakeholders. The 
provincial internal audit, the department of planning, M&E; and the Auditor-general 
were used in an attempt to solicit external views pertaining to capacity gaps and 
systems problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial government 
departments.  The qualitative researcher interacted with all seven targeted participants 
that have been listed in the schedule, and they have granted their consent to 
participate in the data collection process. A total number of three external participants 
who have been listed in the schedule have confirmed their availability and willingness to 
participate in the data collection process. Both internal (Annexure A) and external 
(Annexure B) questionnaires were physically administered by the qualitative researcher, 
and a maximum of forty-five minutes was allocated per interviewee.   
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The researcher chose interview as data collection technique because time frame was 
allocated to a set of predetermined questions that the targeted participants were 
required to answer. Interview sessions enabled the researcher to interact face-to-face 
with the targeted people for the study, and this had the potential of creating a platform 
for posing follow-up questions instantly as an attempt to delve deep into the matter or 
to solicit more clarity or information.  
 
3.2.5 Establish rapport 
 
“A researcher has to establish rapport before a participant will share personal 
information” (Dawson, 2002: p70). The qualitative researcher was smartly dressed and 
arrived fifteen minutes before the start of the set interview session; and all sessions 
were conducted in a professional manner. The researcher posed two simple questions 
as an attempt to ease tension and establish rapport between the interviewer and 
interviewee.  
 
3.2.6 Interview schedule 
 
The qualitative researcher opted for semi-structured interview, and therefore both the 
internal and external interview schedules were rolled-out during data collection 
processes. Flexibility was maintained by posing probing questions where it was 
required. Additional information that was valuable for the research project was jotted 
down for enhancing data analysis process. Interview schedules were geared at 
investigating amongst others the main problems that could hinder the M&E Unit from 
producing adequate, accurate & reliable non-financial performance information, and 
actions that are applied against poor performance information reporting. 
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3.2.7 Methods of recording 
 
The researcher applied both note taking and voice recording systems throughout 
interview sessions. It was explained to all interviewees that such systems were chosen 
simply because they were complementary to each other, for instance, information that 
could not be captured correctly in writing was captured adequately through voice 
recording gadget. A balance was maintained between note-taking and paying attention 
to what was being said by an interviewee. A transcription of interview data was 
compiled immediately after each and every interview session to avoid missing any 
valuable information. A cellular phone gadget was utilized for voice recording during all 
interview sessions, and data collected through such system was stored in a hard-drive 
for back-up purpose.  
 
3.2.8 Data analysis 
Data analysis is a research tool that is applied to reduce the collected data into a 
manageable size, and it also involves categorising the collected data according to 
patterns or themes. The researcher coded both the internal and external questionnaires 
as a measure to reduce the burden of compressing volumes of data collected into 
smaller and manageable set of abstract and underlying themes. Coded data that was 
collected was captured on a spread sheet immediately after each and every interview 
session has been conducted. The system was applied for data analysis process, and the 
results were interpreted before they could be transcribed into the research report. 
“There are many dedicated qualitative analysis programs of various kinds available to 
social researchers that can be used for a variety of different tasks” (Dawson, 2002: 
p121). 
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3.2.9 Research reliability and validity 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010: p93) state that validity of a measurement instrument is the 
extent to which the instrument measures what is actually intended to measure, and 
reliability of a measurement instrument is the extent to which the instrument yields 
consistent results when the characteristics being measured have not changed. Any 
social research is evaluated based on reliability, replication, and validity of data that has 
been collected. Research reliability focuses mainly on the extent to which the results of 
a study could be repeated, and research validity focuses on the integrity of the final 
research report The researcher attempted to enhance reliability and validity of the 
research project by conducting the interviews himself, without the involvement of 
research assistants.    
3.2.10 Ethical considerations 
The qualitative researcher was mindful of the fact that he has responsibility to his 
research participants, colleagues and relevant stakeholders to whom the research 
findings will be presented. In an attempt to avoid causing any harm to interviewees, the 
researcher observes four ethical principles, as elaborated by Beauchamp and Childress 
(1983): autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 
p101) suggest that the research ethics focus mainly on the protection of participants 
from harm, people should not be coerced to participate, the right to privacy should be 
maintained, and honesty should prevail during the process of communicating the 
findings of the study.  
 
The researcher ensured that all participants who were listed for interviews freely 
consented to participate, meaning they were not coerced or unfairly pressurized to 
partake in the process. Data collected was treated with the confidentiality and honesty 
it deserved. Care in handling the collected data will include that the identity of the 
participants will be protected at all times and that notebooks and  computer files will as 
safeguarded (as detailed by Patton and Cochran, 2007: p7).  
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3.3 Conclusion 
Qualitative research methodology was applied throughout in the research report. The 
researcher was directly involved in data collection and data analysis processes as a 
measure of striving to produce a report that is characterized by data that is adequate, 
accurate, reliable and verifiable. The research report was anchored on key research 
ethics such as confidentiality, protection, and honesty. 
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CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF THE DATA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research data regarding the capacity gaps and systems 
problems in M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments 
between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. AS Chapter three indicates, this thesis is 
qualitative in nature, and therefore responses that have been derived from nine key 
respondents; and statistical and numeric information that has been gathered through 
documentary analysis will be presented as a narrative in the report.  
Before presenting the research data, it is worth noting that on the 7th July 2014 the 
North West Extraordinary Gazette was issued, which made proclamation on the 
reconfiguration of the provincial government departments. The researcher, through the 
consent of the research supervisor, had to revise the internal questionnaire as a result 
of the non-availability of Heads of Departments and some senior managers who gave 
consent to participate in the interview session prior to the reconfiguration process.  
 
A total number of six respondents from the targeted provincial departments, including 
the Office of the Premier, were interviewed. In addition, three representatives from 
institutional oversight structures such as the provincial internal audit, the Auditor-
general and the DPME were also interviewed during the data collection process. All 
respondents who were interviewed served at management level and they had more 
than five years of experience in M&E systems. 
 
Predetermined themes and sub-themes were developed as a measure to allow the 
categorization of data sets that were aimed at addressing both the primary and 
secondary research questions pertaining to capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E 
system in the North West provincial government departments. 
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Table 3: Themes & sub-themes derived from key respondents & documentary analysis 
Theme Sub-theme 
Compliance with policy frameworks 
& transcripts 
Approved M&E Policy 
Submission of reports 
Reported cases of under-performance or over-
performance 
Institutionalised M&E System Location of M&E Unit 
Challenges regarding availability of resources in M&E 
Unit 
Purpose of M&E Value of M&E reports in decision-making processes 
Effect of M&E System on Performance Information 
Report 
Participatory M&E Oversight role on M&E system 
Linkage to M&E Structures 
Transparency and Accountability Value for money 
Internal control systems for under-performance & 
under-performance 
Quality assurer 
Motivation for deviations 
M&E function incorporated in job descriptions 
Capacity in M&E Capacity gaps and systems problems in M&E 
Remedies for addressing the M&E problems 
 
Table 1 depicts predetermined themes and sub-themes that have been applied to 
categorise data sets that have been solicited through interviews and documentary 
analysis processes. 
   
4.1.1 Compliance with policy frameworks and prescripts 
 
This section of the thesis is aimed at determining whether the North West provincial 
government departments are in compliance with policy frameworks and prescripts that 
regulate the results-based M&E system, and they include amongst others, the 
Constitution of the RSA, Act 108 of 1996; the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004; the 
government-wide M&E system (2007); the Framework for Managing Programme 
Performance Information (2007); and the Framework for Strategic Plans and Annual 
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Performance Plans (2010). The documents reviewed revealed that inadequate controls 
regarding performance information and compliance with key legislation (Auditor-
general, 2014: p10) continue to prevent the North West provincial government 
departments from obtaining clean audit outcomes.  
 
Part of this section was geared at addressing the following three questions that can be 
presented under the headings: (1) Availability of M&E Units and approved M&E policies 
in the departments; (2) Compliance in terms of the set statutory dates for the 
submission of performance information reports; and (3) Cases of non-compliance that 
were reported during the years under review pertaining to performance information 
reports.   
 
(1) Availability of M&E Units and approved M&E policies in the departments 
 
The policy framework for government-wide M&E system is geared at promoting the 
integration of internal management systems in the public sector, thereby serving as a 
guideline for the development and implementation of the results-based M&E system. 
This study has found that all the North West Provincial government departments have 
functional M&E Units, and this achievement was attributed to the intervention of the 
Office of the Premier. Respondents from the institutional oversight structures attested 
to the fact that all the North West provincial government departments have functional 
M&E Units in place, but they indicated that few of the departments, amongst them the 
Office of the Premier; the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture; and the Department 
of Public Works can provide evidence of an approved M&E policy. For instance, a 
concern was raised that: 
“There were lack of M&E policies and procedures for performance information in most of the 
provincial departments during the financial years under review” (Respondent no.5, January 
2017). 
 
 46 
Three out of six respondents furnished the researcher with their approved departmental 
M&E policies. In the sample group, provincial departments have coined their M&E 
policies differently and this has the potential of promoting inconsistency in terms of the 
quality of performance information reports. For instance, the Office of the Premier, the 
Provincial Treasury, and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development apply a 
Performance Information Reporting Policy Guideline for performance information; and 
Policy Framework for Planning and Managing Performance Information respectively. 
Planning element is missing in other M&E policies. According to respondent no. 9: 
The Provincial Treasury has an approved Guideline for Performance Information, and the 
guideline is recognised by the National Treasury, the Department of Public Service and 
Administration; and the then Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation 
(Respondent no.9, January 2015) 
 
It was revealed that the Department of Health’s M&E policy is still in a draft form, and 
this was ascribed to the fact that the Director: M&E post has been vacant for the past 
four years. Such a draft policy should be ratified by the departmental management 
committee before it could be approved by the Accounting Officers. It leaves much to be 
desire for such a critical service delivery department to be operating without an 
approved M&E policy. 
 
The research has found that in general the provincial departments do have M&E policies 
in place, but some policies are still in the development stage. Poor implementation of 
M&E policies or the ineffectiveness thereof could be linked to the Auditor-general’s 
concern that the provincial departments lack M&E policies and procedures for managing 
performance information. 
 
(2) Compliance in terms of the set statutory dates for the submission of performance           
information reports 
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It is worth noting that the Policy Framework for Strategic Plans and Annual Performance 
Plans is geared at clarifying the connection between accountability documents that 
should be produced by the public sector at each stage of the planning, budgeting, 
implementation, reporting, monitoring and evaluation cycle. Such accountability 
documents are in the form of monthly reports, quarterly performance reports, and in-
year monitoring reports; and they must be submitted within the set dates to the 
relevant institutional oversight structures. Dates that have been set by the Office of the 
Auditor-general for audit purpose and process are statutory in nature, and therefore 
failure of any department or entity to submit the required information within the set 
turn-around time is tantamount to non-compliance (Respondent no. 5, December 
2014). 
 
The research has found that all provincial departments submitted their performance 
information reports timeously to the relevant institutional oversight structure, but in 
most instances the quality of such reports was not satisfactory. This finding was 
confirmed by the Provincial Internal Audit, the Auditor-general, and the Department of 
Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation when they stated that the North West 
provincial government departments, except public entities, have slightly improved in 
terms of submission deadlines of accountability reports; however they raised a concern 
that there is a culture of submitting such reports without being quality assured and/or 
without attaching portfolios of evidence.  
 
There has been little change with regard to non-submission or late submission 
(Auditor-general, 2013: p25) as there were still five auditees (all of them public 
entities) that did not prepare annual performance reports, and this could be 
ascribed to the lack of oversight by the MECs at public entities and departments 
responsible for these entities. 
 
A significant number of cases that are related to malicious compliance regarding the 
quality of accountability reports were identified, and they manifested themselves in the 
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form of performance information reports that were not useful and reliable for decision-
making purposes. This malicious compliance regarding the quality of accountability 
reports could be ascribed to dereliction of M&E function by programme managers. 
 
(3) Reported cases of under-performance or over-performance   
 
In terms of the Public Audit Act, No. 25 of 2004, the Auditor-general is mandated to 
audit the public sector on financial and non-financial performance, and therefore cases 
of under-performance and over-performance must be accounted for. The research has 
found that during the financial years under review the provincial departments lacked 
mechanisms that could be applied to deal with the identified cases of under-
performance and over-performance, and this is tantamount to non-compliance with the 
Public Audit Act and other policy frameworks that regulated the results-based 
monitoring and evaluation system in the country. 
 
Respondent no. 1 stated that inadequate systems for risk management in M&E 
systems; poor internal performance information framework; performance indicators that 
are not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and time-bound); and a lack 
of knowledge in M&E systems could be attributed to non-compliance of the North West 
provincial departments regarding performance information reports. This was further 
substantiated by respondent no. 5 when he stated that:  
“In 2013/14 financial year, the entire North West provincial departments, except the Office of the 
Premier, experienced regression in terms of the quality of performance information reports that were 
submitted for auditing purposes” (Respondent no.5, December 2015). 
 
The most common findings on the usefulness of performance information (Auditor-
general, 2013: p25) of the North West provincial government departments were the 
following: 
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 Reported performance information not consistent with planned objectives, 
indicators/measures and targets 
 Indicators/measures not being well defined 
 Reasons for variances not being explained or supported by corroborating 
evidence 
 
The thesis has revealed that a majority of the provincial departments could not address 
issues that were raised by the Auditor-general pertaining to performance indicators that 
are not aligned to the SMART principles. This material concern on performance 
indicators remained unresolved during the financial years under review, and which is 
why the majority of the provincial departments obtained qualified opinion on 
performance information during the same period. 
 
4.1.2 Institutionalised M&E System 
 
The policy framework for the government-wide M&E system is aimed at promoting 
accountability and transparency in the public sector thereby streamlining internal 
management control systems. The GWM&E system, however is a combination of 
different M&E systems (Dumela, 2013: p36), rather than an integrated system. This 
section of the questionnaire solicited information from the respondents regarding the 
extent to which the North West provincial departments have institutionalized their own 
M&E systems. The following sub-titles were used to investigate this aspect of the 
research project: (1) Location of M&E Unit in the provincial departments, and (2) Major 
problems that are related to the availability of resources in M&E Unit.  
 
(1) Location of M&E Unit in the provincial departments 
 
Interview sessions and documentary analysis that were conducted revealed that there 
was disparity in the provincial departments pertaining to the manner in which M&E 
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Units were structured and located. For instance, the Office of the Premier has two 
different M&E Units. The first M&E Unit is located under the Administration Branch: 
Strategic and Management Services, and it is solely responsible for internal M&E 
processes and systems. The second M&E Unit is linked to the Chief Directorate: Policy, 
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation; and it is responsible for the coordination of M&E 
function both in the provincial departments and municipalities. 
 
On the other hand, it was found that the Department of Health has three different 
programme specific M&E Units that feed into the major departmental M&E Unit that is 
located under the Directorate: Policy, Planning, Research, Monitoring and Evaluation. 
These programme specific M&E Units channel their resources towards the process of 
monitoring and evaluating financial and non-financial performance of their respective 
programmes and plans. General performance of the department is catered for under 
the broader M&E Unit. Respondent no. 3 highlighted that: 
 
The Directorate: Policy, Planning, Research, Monitoring and Evaluation derive performance 
information reports from three departmental M&E sub-programmes such as the National Health 
Insurance, Planning Services, and Health Services (Respondent no.3, December 2015).  
 
This discrepancy in the institutionalization of M&E system was evident in various 
provincial departments. For example, in the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture the 
M&E Unit is attached to the Directorate: Strategic Management, and in the Department 
of Agriculture and Rural Development the same Unit is housed under the Directorate: 
Policy and Planning. According to respondent no. 8: 
 
The Directorate: Policy and Planning accounts directly to the Head of Department for Agriculture 
and Rural Development; and the directorate is also responsible for executing M&E function 
(Respondent no.8, January 2015). 
 
Respondent no.1 indicated that M&E Units of the North West provincial departments are 
generally located under the Directorate: Strategic Management; or Directorate: Policy 
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and Planning; or Directorate: Strategic Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation; or 
Directorate Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation.  
 
In summary, the results-based M&E Units are structured and located differently 
throughout the provincial departments; and this has the potential of derailing the North 
West provincial government from achieving clean audit on performance information in 
the future. There are provincial departments that operated without a dedicated M&E 
Unit and this impacted negatively on data management process, and the Department of 
Rural Development could be cited as an example. Respondent no. 9 retorted that: 
 
Prior to 2012/13 financial year, the North West Provincial Treasury’s organisational structure had 
no provision for M&E Unit (Respondent no. 9, January 2015). 
 
(2) Major problems that are related to the availability of resources in M&E Unit.  
 
This portion of the questionnaire was aimed at identifying major problems experienced 
by the North West provincial government departments regarding the availability of 
resources for the roll-out process of the M&E system. All respondents acknowledged 
that resource problems that are related to the system are multifaceted in nature. 
Hence, they reported that their departmental M&E systems were characterized by 
factors such as a lack of leadership, inadequate personnel, inadequate skills, inadequate 
office space and inadequate budget. For instance, it was indicated that the Department 
of Sport, Arts and Culture’s M&E system is plagued by the following factors: 
 
 Staffing both numerically and qualitative – as most of the officials do not have 
qualifications in M&E. 
 Cooperation from programmes in terms of reporting on time and accurately. 
 Provision of portfolio of evidence (POE) for reported performance information by 
programmes. 
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Albeit it is the responsibility of programme managers to ensure quality assurance on 
performance information, but the overall validation of such data rests with the Director: 
Strategic Management (Respondent no. 9, January 2015). This was further 
substantiated by respondent no. 7 by stating that some programme managers assume 
that M&E function is the sole responsibility of the Directorate: Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation. 
 
There is a shortage of M&E skills in the provincial departments and this could be 
ascribed to lack of leadership and inadequate budget. For instance, the results-based 
M&E Unit in the Department of Health operated with one Deputy Director and one 
Assisted Director for some years, and the incumbent Director: Planning, Policy, 
Research, M&E was only appointed in the 2nd quarter of 2013/14 financial year. It was 
emphasised that: 
“The department had no Director: Planning, Policy, Research, M&E for the past three to four 
years and as the result only Deputy Director and Assistant Director were responsible for the M&E 
function” (Respondent no. 3, December 2015). 
 
4.1.3 Context and purpose of M&E system  
 
This section sought to determine the extent to which the results-based M&E system has 
served any purpose in improving the general performance of the North West provincial 
government departments. Sub-themes such as the following were crafted to investigate 
this matter, (1) Do the management committees consider M&E reports for decision 
making processes; and (2) Effectiveness of M&E System on performance information 
reports.  
 
Respondents generally embrace M&E as an instrument that is necessary for ensuring 
that the government accounts for public resources that have been applied towards 
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service delivery. It is however acknowledged that the system in the provincial 
departments is not effective and efficient as it should be. 
 
(1) Do the management committees consider M&E reports for decision making       
processes? 
 
All respondents acknowledged that their various departmental management committees 
consider their M&E reports for decision-making process. The departmental management 
committees utilise their quarterly reports to determine the extent to which their 
departmental performance targets have been attained, and where a need arises 
recovery plans are developed.  
 
It was found that the Office of the Premier is the only institution in the entire provincial 
government that applied an electronic M&E system to upload performance information 
and relevant portfolios of evidence during data management processes. Quarterly 
performance reports that were generated by the electronic system were presented 
before the departmental management committee for interrogation and buy-in. It was 
indicated by respondent no. 2 that: 
 
The departmental management committee was responsible for the development of a dashboard 
matrix that was applied to address the departmental under-performance and over-performance. 
(Respondent no. 2, December 2015). 
 
All respondents indicated that their departmental quarterly performance reports were 
generated manually and they were also presented to the departmental management 
committee for discussions before their final sign off by their respective Accounting 
Officers. A concern was raised that inadequate performance information deprived the 
departmental management committees from taking informed decisions, and this 
problem was compounded by the fact that there were lack of systems that could be 
applied to enforce the implementation on the M&E outcomes.  
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Respondent 6 had a gloomier picture:  
“Not really as the quarterly M&E reports are not keenly taken into account for decision 
making on departmental matters. It is mostly considered as a compliance matter than 
a guide and mirror for departmental management affair” (Respondent no. 6, January 
2015). 
 
Respondent no. 7 indicated that: 
“The departmental quarterly performance reports are presented to the departmental 
management committee on an ad hoc basis for decision-making purposes, and therefore this 
matter needs to be improved” (Respondent no. 7, January 2015). 
 
During the financial years under review, quarterly performance reports were indeed 
discussed at the departmental management committee level throughout the provincial 
departments. However, the Auditor-general emphasised that Action Plans that were 
derived from such quarterly performance reviews were irrelevant or not implementable 
because only few senior managers and Accounting Officers pledged their unwavering 
support towards their attainment.  
 
(2) Effectiveness of M&E System on performance information reports 
 
“The main issues militating against an effective M&E function are those of capacity, 
resources, and the fact that the importance of M&E is not properly communicated, 
leading to it not being a priority” (Naidoo, 2011: p281). One of the findings of this 
thesis was that problems of M&E systems in the provincial departments were complex 
and deep rooted. Inadequate oversight role, lack of leadership, lack of accountability, 
inadequate skills, inadequate policies, a lack of budget were identified as critical aspects 
that declared the provincial M&E system ineffective for the period under review. 
 
Figure: 4 Three-year trend-quality of annual performance reports 
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Source: General audit outcome of the North West Province for 2013/14 
 
The Auditor-general used Figure 4 to depict the ineffectiveness of M&E system in the 
North West provincial government. In 2011/12 financial year, eighty five percent of the 
provincial auditees obtained qualified opinion on performance information; and one 
percent improvement was registered in the subsequent financial year. Between 2011/12 
and 2013/14 financial years there was of eight percent of the provincial auditees that 
received qualified opinion on performance information.   
 
The Office of the Premier obtained a qualified opinion on performance information in 
the 2012/13 financial year. The Provincial Treasury was the only provincial auditee that 
got a clean audit on performance information in 2013/14 financial year.  
 
Respondent no. 2 stated that: 
“The Office of the Premier received a qualified report on performance information in 2013/14 
financial year, and this could be attributed to the effectiveness of M&E system pertaining to the 
generation of performance information that is useful and reliable” (Respondent no. 2, December 
2014).  
 
Respondent no. 5 emphasised that: 
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The North West Provincial Treasury is the only department that obtained a clean audit report in 
2013/14 financial year (Respondent no. 5, December 2014). 
 
4.1.4 Capacity in M&E  
 
This section of the thesis investigated capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E 
systems of the North West provincial government departments between 2010/11 and 
2013/14 financial years. This could be ascribed to the fact that the majority of the 
provincial government departments received qualified opinion on performance 
information during the periods under review.  
 
The thesis revealed that the results-based M&E system in the North West provincial 
government departments was characterised by a significant number of capacity gaps 
and systems problems during the periods under review. Firstly, inadequate oversight 
role and poor leadership was very rife in the provincial departments and that 
compromised the notion of good governance. Secondly, the vacuum in the oversight 
role and leadership impacted negatively on the departmental internal management 
control systems for instance certain departments lacked approved M&E policies or they 
lacked an effective system that could be applied for data collection, collation, analysis 
and storage. Thirdly, personnel attached to the departmental M&E Directorates/Units 
did not possess the relevant M&E skills. Fourthly, programme managers submitted their 
performance information reports to the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate/Unit 
without being quality assured and without attaching corroborating evidence. Fifthly, 
departmental performance indicators did not satisfy the requirements of the SMART 
principle (specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and time-bound). Action plans that 
were derived from issues that were raised by the Portfolio Committees, the Social 
Cluster Audit Committee, and the Auditor-general were not monitored. Lastly, there was 
lack of accountability for poor reporting of performance information and poor 
performance.  
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Respondents made the following comments pertaining to capacity of the results-based 
monitoring and evaluation at the departmental level: 
 
Prior to 2012/13, the North West Provincial Treasury’s organizational structure had no provision 
for the M&E Unit (Respondent no. 9, January 2015). 
 
Provincial departments are characterized by capacity gaps and systems problems such as an 
effective M&E structure, a lack of M&E policy, lack of electronic M&E system, and ineffective 
quarterly performance reviews (Respondent no. 1, December 2014). 
 
The Department of Health experienced cases of double counting on performance information and 
this could be attributed to a lack of national information system (Respondent no. 3, December 
2014). 
 
There is culture of submitting monthly and quarterly performance information reports to the 
departmental M&E Unit without being quality assured by the relevant programme managers. The 
problem is further compounded by factors such as poor and under-reporting; non-supply of 
portfolios of evidence for reported performance; non-achievement of some set targets; and lack 
of convincing explanation for deviations in achievement of set targets by programmes 
(Respondent no. 6, January 2015). 
 
In 2013/14 financial year, there were a range of the most common audit findings 
(Auditor-general, 2014: p26) that were identified at the North West provincial 
government departments. It was highlighted that some provincial departments did not 
have approved and/or comprehensive policies and procedures for reporting on 
performance. The audit outcomes indicated that the departmental performance 
indicators did not always comply with the SMART criteria and therefore they could not 
be relied upon for generating credible performance information that could be applied 
for decision-making purposes. The Auditor-general emphasised that the departmental 
performance targets were not realistic as they were not selected based on accurate 
baseline information or research and evaluations. It was further reported that the 
provincial departments had inadequate skilled personnel for dealing with matters that 
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are related to M&E function. One of the grave concerns was that some provincial 
departments failed to hold their personnel accountable for underperformance in 
reporting on performance and/or achieving performance targets. Some provincial 
departments did not have an approved process and system for data collecting, collating, 
verifying, storing and reporting on actual performance. Lastly, the audit outcomes 
indicated that the provincial departments hardly crafted action plans for addressing 
underperformance that occurred or to deal with the identified performance reporting 
shortcomings. 
 
Both the findings of the study and the provincial audit outcomes for 2013/14 financial 
highlighted a vacuum in oversight role and poor leadership as the crux of capacity gaps 
and systems problems in the provincial M&E system. The departments operated without 
basic internal management control systems such as approved M&E systems, dedicated 
M&E Directorate/Units, accountability system, and failure to develop action plans for 
addressing discrepancies in audit outcomes served as evidence that there was 
inadequate oversight role and poor leadership in the provincial departments. It was 
evident enough that the executive and accounting authorities of various provincial 
departments deliberately ignored the contents of the management letters that were 
issued by the Auditor-general during the periods under review. All matters in the 
management letters (Muchaonyera, 2014, p1) that are issued by the Auditor-general 
should be evaluated and acted upon even where a positive audit outcome has been 
achieved The coordinating institutions, specifically the provincial treasury (Auditor-
general, 2014: p13) should continue to improve the assistance and guidance they 
provide to departments and public entities to address previous year audit findings, 
implement action plans and address internal control deficiencies. 
 
This portion of the thesis could be summarized by stating that all capacity gaps and 
systems problems in the results-based monitoring and evaluation system in the North 
West provincial government department are as the result of inadequate oversight role 
and poor leadership.  
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4.1.5 Participatory M&E System 
 
This part of the thesis is geared at determining the extent to which the North West 
Provincial Executive Council is exercising its oversight role in the implementation of the 
results-based M&E system in the provincial government departments. It also seeks to 
investigate M&E networks that the provincial government departments have established 
for benchmarking purposes. 
 
(1) The extent to which the North West Provincial Executive Council exercises its 
oversight role in the implementation process of the M&E System 
 
The Constitution of the RSA, Act 108 of 1996, Section 114 (2) states that a provincial 
legislature must provide for mechanisms:-   
 
 to ensure that all provincial executive organs of state in the province are 
accountable to it.  
 to maintain oversight of the exercise of provincial executive authority in the 
province, including the implementation of legislations. 
 
The audit outcomes for 2013/14 financial year indicate that the North West provincial 
oversight institutions did not provide performance management and reporting guidance 
and oversight (Auditor-general, 2014: p26). Respondent no.1 & 5 shared the same 
concern that non-compliance matters that were raised to various provincial departments 
regarding performance information remained unresolved or were repetitive in nature 
during the periods under review. For instance, the latter respondent stated: 
“In 2012/13 financial year, the resolutions of the North West Provincial Public Accounts 
Committee stood at hundred and fifty nine, and only forty of such resolutions were fully 
implemented in the following financial year” (Respondent no. 5, December 2014). 
 
 60 
Concerns pertaining to the repetitiveness of non-compliance on performance 
information were presented in the following fashion: 
 
Respondent no. 1 stated that: 
Performance information matters that were escalated by the Social Cluster Audit 
Committee to the Provincial Executive Council, for intervention purposes, took longer 
to be resolved or they remained unresolved (Respondent no. 1, December 2014). 
 
On the other hand, it was highlighted by respondent no. 5 that  
The Office of the Premier minimally monitored the quality of provincial performance 
information, and that had the potential of derailing the process of developing the 
provincial capacity building strategy for the provincial departments that under-
performed or had performance reporting shortcomings (Respondent no. 5, December 
2014). 
 
Despite the above-mentioned concerns, the study revealed that all the provincial 
departments regularly submitted their accountability documents, including performance 
information reports, to the relevant institutional oversight structures. And such 
structures were the Office of the Premier; various Portfolio Committees in the Provincial 
Legislatures; the Provincial Executive Council, the Broader Executive Technical 
Committee, the Provincial Treasury, Social Cluster Audit Committee; and Governance 
and Administration Cluster. All respondents were in agreement that their Accounting 
Officers, through the support of their departmental management committees, were 
responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of action plans that 
were derived from non-compliance issues, specifically on performance information, that 
were raised by the above-mentioned structures. For instance, respondent no. 6 stated 
that: 
The oversight role is exercised through the planning commission that houses the provincial 
monitoring and evaluation unit, and through the provincial treasury that houses the provincial 
reporting system that reports quarterly to the National M&E (Respondent no. 6, January 2015). 
 
This portion of the thesis revealed that the relevant institutional oversight structures 
neglected their oversight role which is why majority of the provincial departments 
received qualified opinion on performance information during the periods under review. 
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General performance of such institutional oversight structures compromised the 
provincial departments and the entire provincial government from attaining good 
governance in those financial years.  
 
(2) Are the provincial government departments connected to M&E structures or forums 
and what benefits have been derived from such structures or forums? 
 
The results-based M&E system is virtually a new public management tool that is 
destined at improving the quality of public service delivery thereby promoting 
transparency and accountability. This portion of the study is therefore geared at 
determining the results-based M&E networks that the North West provincial 
departments had established as a measure to keep their own M&E system abreast with 
the latest developments.  
 
Respondents from various provincial departments confirmed that they have established 
networks with different M&E structures such as institutions of higher learning, the 
provincial and national M&E fora, mainly for benchmarking purposes. For instance, the 
respondent no. 2 retorted: 
that the Office of the Premier was responsible for coordination of the provincial M&E 
forum that constituted of the departmental M&E representatives. It was further stated 
that the provincial M&E forum represented the provincial government in the national 
M&E forum that is currently coordinated by the Department of Planning, Monitoring 
and Evaluation in the Office of the Presidency. Lastly, the Office of the Premier 
participated in planning and M&E meetings that were convened by the provincial 
Department of Finance (Respondent no. 2, December 2014).   
 
It was found that except for the provincial and national M&E fora, the Department of 
Health also attended productivity workshops that were coordinated by the Department 
of Public Service and Administration.  
 
Respondent no. 6 confirmed that the departmental M&E Unit is linked to both the 
provincial treasury system and that of the planning commission in the Office of the 
Premier.  
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The M&E Unit has benefited consistently through the information sharing and reporting fora 
periodically held by both the provincial treasury and the planning commission to address M&E 
matters. These fora sometimes serve as training sessions as well (Respondent no. 6, January 
2015). 
 
The study found that the existing M&E fora basically created a platform for information 
sharing regarding matters that were related to the institutionalisation of the results-
based monitoring and evaluation system. For instance, the provincial M&E forum 
generally discussed M&E problems that were experienced by the provincial departments 
regarding the roll-out of the M&E system, and it had not assisted the departments with 
the actual development of performance indicators that satisfied the criteria of SMART 
principle. On the other hand, the then Department of Performance, Monitoring and 
Evaluation was not focused on the quality of performance information, instead it applied 
the management performance assessment tool (MPAT) to appraise management 
performance based on four key performance areas such as strategic management, 
governance and accountability, human resource management, and financial 
management.  
 
All respondents indicated that, “The departmental M&E Directorates/Units benefited enormously 
from information sessions that were coordinated by the provincial and the national M&E fora” (All 
respondents, December 2014 and January 2015). 
 
Respondent no. 4 stated that, “MPAT is mainly aimed at developing good practice case studies that 
could be disseminated through learning networks” (Respondent no. 4, December 2014).   
 
This part of the study could be summarised by stating that all provincial departments 
are affiliated to the provincial and national M&E fora. The findings of the study further 
indicated that the meetings of such fora did not yield positive outcomes in terms of 
addressing capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the provincial 
departments during the periods under review. 
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4.1.6 Transparency and accountability 
 
The Constitution of the country and other policy frameworks that regulate the results-
based M&E system stipulate that accountability and transparency should prevail in the 
public sector. For example, it is contained in the Framework for Managing Programme 
Performance Information (2007: p5) that performance information reported in 
accountability documents enables parliament, provincial legislatures, municipal councils 
and the public to track government performance, and to hold it accountable. 
 
The level of transparency and accountability in the provincial government departments 
was investigated in this section of the thesis thereby addressing the following research 
questions: 
 
(1) Is M&E function incorporated in job descriptions of managers who are directly 
involved in data management processes? 
 
In terms of legislative frameworks that regulate the public sector programme managers 
should be held accountable for their performances and this is applied through 
performance management development system (PDMS). The study has indicated that 
only programme managers for M&E Directorates/Units were held accountable for the 
M&E function during the periods under review. All respondents acknowledged that M&E 
function found expression in performance agreement of programme managers who are 
attached to the M&E Directorate/Unit only. For instance, respondents reported as 
follows: 
the results-based M&E function should be implemented by every departmental unit, but the 
reality is that this function does not find any expression in job specifications of all programme 
managers (Respondent no. 2, December 2014).  
 
programme managers are not appraised on M&E function, except the one who is directly 
attached to the M&E Unit (Respondent no. 3, December 2014). 
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According to the findings of the study all programme managers, except those who were 
responsible M&E Directorates/Units, could not be held accountable for poor quality of 
their performance information reports. It was indicated that not all programme 
managers were accountable for M&E function and this impacted negatively on 
accountability. 
(2) Who in terms of seniority is responsible for ensuring quality assurance during data 
management processes?  
 
Part of this research was to investigate the extent of the value chain in quality 
assurance during data management processes. The results-based M&E system is a tool 
that could be applied to promote accountability and transparency in the public sectors.  
 
Different provincial departments applied different internal management control systems 
for conducting quality assurance on performance information reports. For example, 
respondent no. 2 indicated that the Office of the Premier applied an electronic M&E 
system for data management processes. All programme managers were required by the 
system to conduct quality assurance on monthly performance information reports and 
portfolios of evidence that were uploaded on the system for accountability reasons.  
The departmental M&E Unit was responsible for conducting final quality assurance on the 
consolidated performance information reports and portfolios of evidence before such data could 
be presented to the departmental management committee for ratification (Respondent no.2, 
December 2014).  
 
A general concern was raised that programme managers are not hands-on in terms of 
validating performance information reports before submission to the M&E 
Directorate/Unit for consolidation. It was indicated that programme managers 
deliberately played ignorant by submitting accountability reports that were not quality 
assured. There was a trend of submitting monthly and quarterly reports that had no 
corroborating evidence and that was tantamount to malicious compliance. Eight 
respondents stated that quality assurance on performance information was conducted 
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to a larger extent by the programme managers who were directly responsible for the 
M&E Directorates/Units. The following sentiments were echoed: 
 
Albeit it is the responsibility of all programme managers to ensure quality assurance on 
performance information reports, but the overall validation of such reports rests with the 
Director: Strategic Management (Respondent no. 9, January 2015). 
 
The prevalence of discrepancies in performance information reports could be ascribed to poor 
coordination of the departmental monthly or quarterly reports and portfolios of evidence. Such 
data is generated and submitted directly to the departmental M&E Unit without being quality 
assured either by the relevant programme managers or Chief Directors (Respondent no.6, 
January 2015).   
 
The Office of the Premier was the only government structure in the province that 
applied an internal management control system that compelled all programme 
managers to account for their performances. Performance information reports are 
generally submitted to the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate/Unit without being 
quality assured. 
 
(3) Do programme managers provide reasons for under-performance or over-
performance of their directorates or units? 
 
Respondents indicated that their programme managers provided motivation for their 
under-performance or over-performance on quarterly basis, and such motivations were 
supported by comprehensive action or recovery plans. They substantiated their 
argument by stating that the quarterly performance report template required reasons 
for deviations and corrective measures that should be applied to remedy the situation.  
 
The National Treasury introduced the Quarterly Performance System (QPS) that requires reason 
for under-performance or over-performance and recovery plan for such performance 
(Respondent no. 8, January 2015). 
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This was however challenged by respondent no. 1 and 5 when they stated that the 
provincial departments could not account for under-performance and/or over-
performance on performance information that was experienced during the financial 
years under review.  
 
This section of the study revealed that the departmental reasons that were provided for 
under-performance or over-performance were either inexplicit or irrelevant. Further 
than that, the departmental recovery plans were not monitored and therefore they were 
not implemented.  
 
(4) Which measures have been put in place for dealing with cases of under-
performance and over-performance in terms of the set departmental targets? 
 
There were cases of under-performance and over-performance that were reported 
during the periods under review, and such cases manifested themselves in the form of 
actual performance targets that were not aligned to the approved Annual Performance 
Plan (APP). Action plan approach was applied as an endeavor to address such 
problems, and such an approach which had clear time frame. The departmental action 
plans that were generated were not concise, relevant or implementable. More than half 
of the respondents cited the implementation of unplanned projects or activities as the 
real causes of under-performance or over-performance.   
 
A dashboard approach was applied to monitor the implementation of the departmental 
management committee resolutions pertaining to matters that were related to cases of under-
performance and/or over-performance on performance information (Respondent no. 3, December 
2014).   
 
The Accounting Officer demands of senior managers to explain in writing why they under-
performed or over-performed against the set standards. Some cases could even lead to 
disciplinary actions against the responsible managers (Respondent no. 6, January 2015). 
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It was stated in City Press dated the 30th November 2014 that the management letters 
that were issued by the Auditor-general to accompany audit reports, were being 
ignored by most people as long as a positive audit outcome is achieved. 
 
Respondent no. 1 and 5 argue that the departmental action or recovery plans that were 
developed during the financial years under review were inadequate and irrelevant 
mainly because they could not address non-compliance issues that were related to 
performance information.  
The departmental recovery plans were inadequate; they were not addressing the identified 
variances; and they were not realistic (Respondent no. 1, December 2014). 
 
Respondent no. 5 stated that: 
 “the departmental action plans that were developed during the financial years under review 
were not credible; they could not address the real root causes of deviations; they lacked time 
frames; and responsibilities were not assigned appropriately” (Respondent no. 5,  December 
2015). 
 
This section of the study revealed that the provincial departments lacked an effective 
monitoring system for the implementation of recovery plans. Recovery plans that were 
developed lacked substance and they were not implementable. 
 
(5) Is the quality of the departmental performance information reports worth the public 
funds spent? 
 
In terms of Batho Pele Principle, the quality of services that should be provided by the 
public sector should be worth the value of the public funds spent. “A proper M&E 
system ensures that performance information enables oversight bodies and the public 
to determine whether public institutions are delivering  value for money by comparing 
their performance  against their budgets, service delivery and development  plans 
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(Mawelela, 2012: p32) . The North West provincial treasury has led by example and is 
the first department (Auditor-general, 2014: p10) to obtain a clean audit outcome. 
 
The study found that during the periods under review the North West provincial 
treasury was the first department to obtain clean audit outcome and that was for 
2013/14 financial year. Clean audit opinion is the ultimate objective of good governance 
and the provincial treasury for have obtained that status was indicative of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of internal management control systems for both financial 
and non-financial performance aspects. The quality of the audit outcome was 
equivalent to the value of public funds that the provincial treasury spent to execute its 
Constitutional mandate during the period under review. The accounting officer of the 
provincial treasury and senior management, as the first line of defence, successfully 
implemented basic internal controls and accounting disciplines (Auditor-general, 2014: 
p10), which ensured that an effective control environment was maintained, and 
exercised rigorous oversight and support in driving clean audit outcomes. 
 
Respondents no. 1 and 5 highlighted that the provincial departments were 
characterised by inadequate internal management control systems that impacted 
negatively on the notion of good governance. They further emphasised that much still 
needed to be done to sharpen such internal control systems, including the M&E system, 
for the provincial departments to produce credible accountability reports. They raised a 
concern that there were tendencies of implementing projects that were not budgeted 
for and that had the potential of contravening the Public Finance Management Act of 
1999. 
  
Respondent no. 5 stated unequivocally that there have been discrepancies in the overall 
performance of the North West provincial government departments, and they 
manifested themselves in the form of a disjuncture between the actual performance 
and budget consumed. Put into context, the provincial departments consistently spent 
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more public funds and produced less services or deliverables during the financial years 
under review. 
 
Chapter 4 of the thesis could be summarized by stating that capacity gaps and systems 
problems in the monitoring and evaluation system in the North West provincial 
government departments could be ascribed to inadequate oversight role by the relevant 
structures and poor leadership. Institutional oversight structures, executive authorities, 
and accounting officers should take a bold in ensuring that the internal management 
control systems that are related to the M&E system are being improved as an attempt 
to pursue good governance. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter discusses the findings on the capacity gaps and systems problems in the 
North West provincial government departments. The discussion is aligned to objectives 
of the thesis and literature review that is related to M&E system & good governance.  
 
  
 Figure 5: Key findings regarding capacity gaps & systems problems in the provincial M&E system 
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The above figure illustrates that inadequate oversight role and poor leadership were the 
major causes of capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in the North 
West provincial government departments during the periods under review. Such a 
vacuum in the oversight role and leadership impacted negatively on the implementation 
of policy frameworks and prescripts that regulated the M&E systems in the provincial 
government. For instance, the departmental M&E systems were characterised by 
inadequate performance indicators that yielded performance information that could not 
satisfy the requirements of the SMART principles. There was lack of internal 
management control systems in place for addressing matters that were related to non-
compliance of performance information reports that were submitted to the relevant 
oversight structures. 
5.2 Compliance with policy frameworks and prescripts 
The Constitution of the RSA, Act 108 of 1996 is the supreme law of the country and 
therefore it serves as an overarching framework within which public policies should be 
developed and/or reviewed. M&E related policies such as the policy framework for 
government-wide M&E system; and the framework for managing programme 
performance information are geared at promoting two key cornerstones of the 
Constitution, those being: accountability and transparency in the public sector. 
Maphunye (2013: p22) argues that M&E processes in South Africa were introduced as a 
way to assist the public sector in evaluating its performance and identifying the factors 
which contribute to its service delivery outcomes. The process of M&E policy 
development, implementation and review requires effective and efficient oversight role 
and leadership. 
In terms of the findings of the thesis, the capacity gaps and systems problems in the 
M&E system of the North West provincial government departments could be ascribed to 
inadequate oversight role and poor leadership by the relevant structures. The Executive 
Authorities did not hold their respective Accounting Authorities accountable for under-
performance and/or over-performance on performance information, and the latter did 
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likewise to their respective programme managers. Such a vacuum in the oversight role 
and leadership resulted into a lack of approved M&E policies, inadequate performance 
indicators and poor quality of accounting reports during the periods under review. 
Ideally, the implementation of the M&E system should promote syncronisation of 
internal management control systems in any organization as an attempt to enhance 
principles of transparency and accountability. “Some failures in the governance  of 
particular  entities place a particular burden on M&E, which is supposed to demonstrate 
a strong predictive (and directive) capacity by being able to identify problems 
timeously, and ensure that findings and recommendations are directed to the 
appropriate levels before crises are experienced” (Public Service Commission, 2012: 
p9). 
 
It is no longer acceptable to take for granted that the Accounting Officers would 
naturally demonstrate accountable behavior (Public Service Commission, 2012: p9), as 
democracy dictates that a form of probity is always required, and M&E assumes this 
responsibility. The lack of M&E policies in the North West provincial government 
departments remained as one of critical deficiencies in the internal management control 
systems over the years. The findings of the thesis revealed that certain provincial 
departments had no approved M&E policies and the existing M&E policies were either 
ineffective or were poorly implemented. The existence of an enabling legislative and 
policy environment (Dumela, 2013: p4) is pivotal for the implementation of the results-
based M&E system. 
 
The results of the study further revealed that monthly and quarterly performance 
information reports were indeed submitted timeously to the relevant institutional 
oversight structures, but such reports were of poor quality and that was tantamount to 
malicious compliance. It was found that departmental performance indicators did not 
satisfy the SMART principle (specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and time-bound) 
and this impacted negatively on the quality of performance information submitted for 
audit purposes. Inadequate performance indicators comprised the provincial 
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departments from obtaining clean audit on performance information during the periods 
under review. The South African government introduced the M&E policy framework 
(Dumela, 2013: p23) before determining the overall state of readiness of government 
departments. 
In brief, the relevant institutional oversight structures and leadership neglected their 
roles in the implementation of the policy frameworks and prescripts that regulated the 
M&E systems, and that was tantamount to dereliction of their duties. There was a lack 
of commitment and dedication in the roll-out process of such policy frameworks and 
prescripts, and that ultimately resulted into the capacity gaps and systems problems in 
the M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments. M&E systems 
were at the main put in place for compliance purposes, instead of enhancing decision-
making processes in the provincial departments.  
5.3 Institutionalisation of M&E System 
In terms of the policy framework for government-wide M&E systems, the Offices of the 
Premiers are champions of their respective provincial M&E systems, and the Accounting 
Authorities are champions of their departmental M&E systems. The policy framework 
ideally tasks the Offices of the Premiers with the responsibility of ensuring that the 
provincial and local M&E systems are aligned to the national framework. MacKay (2007: 
p23) states that the successful institutionalisation of M&E involves the creation of a 
sustainable, well functioning M&E system within a government where good quality M&E 
information is used intensively. 
Institutional arrangements (Maphunye, 2013: p11) within government lacked M&E 
systems to measure performance and evaluate government policy outcomes. The 
results of the thesis indicated that there was lack of uniformity in terms of how the M&E 
systems were structured and located in the North West provincial government 
departments. In some instances there were provincial departments that operated 
without dedicated M&E Directorates/Units and that had a bearing on the coordination 
and quality assurance processes of performance information reports. The lack of 
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uniformity in the structure and location of the results-based M&E system in the 
provincial departments had the potential of allowing the provincial departments to apply 
their own discretions in terms of the institutionalization of the system. Negative audit 
opinions on performance information that were achieved by the majority of the North 
West provincial government departments could be as a result of the departments, 
through the support of the Office of the Premier, not having conducted M&E readiness 
assessment exercises.  
“Sustaining an M&E system that can produce trustworthy, timely and relevant 
information on the performance of government, civil society or private sector projects, 
programmes and policies requires the overcoming of many M&E system challenges” 
(Gorgens and Kusek, 2009). The findings of the thesis further revealed that the 
provincial departments were characterised by a lack of M&E skills, dereliction of M&E 
function by programme managers, and inadequate budget. Most if not all officials who 
were attached to various M&E Directorates/Units lacked the necessary M&E skills and 
that had the potential of compromising the data management processes. The problem 
was compounded by the fact that dereliction of M&E function by the departmental 
programme managers was rife, and that manifested itself in the form of performance 
information reports that were not quality assured before they could be submitted to the 
M&E Directorates/Units for further processing. The responsibility of quality assurance on 
performance information was shifted to the programme managers who were attached 
to the various M&E Directorates/Units. Inadequate budget also hindered the 
departmental M&E Directorates/Units from being well-resourced pertaining to skilled 
personnel, tools and equipment. For instance, the study revealed that only the Office of 
the Premier possessed fully functional electronic M&E system during the periods under 
review. 
The analysis shows that the Office of the Premier had neglected its legislative mandate 
of ensuring the streamlining of the M&E systems in the provincial government.  For 
instance, the Office of the Premier, as the champion of M&E system in the province, 
obtained clean audit outcomes in 2012/13 financial year, but to date the model has not 
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yet been piloted to other provincial departments. The Office of the Premier should have 
developed the provincial M&E policy as a measure to capacitate the provincial 
departments in their endeavour to institutionalise their own M&E systems, but in vain. 
The champion of the provincial M&E system played a minimal role in providing technical 
guidance and advice pertaining to how the departmental M&E systems should be 
structured, located and resourced. 
5.4 Context and purpose of M&E system  
Systematic evaluation programmes or mechanisms could provide government with 
information that is credible and useful (Scott and Joubert, 2005: p2), that could also 
enable the incorporation of the lessons learned into the decision making process going 
forward. Literature emphasises that the results-based M&E system is an important tool 
that could be applied to enhance governance systems. Ideally, performance information 
reports that have been generated through the M&E system should be useful and 
reliable for decision-making purposes.  
The results of the study indicated that the departmental quarterly performance reports 
were indeed discussed at the various departmental management committee meetings, 
but in most instances such reports were declared to be not useful and reliable by the 
Provincial Internal Audit and the Auditor-general. These two institutional oversight 
structures proved beyond reasonable doubt that there were capacity gaps and systems 
problems in the M&E systems the North West provincial governments departments 
which is why majority of such departments got qualified opinion on performance 
information during the periods under review. The provincial departments were required 
to improve their M&E systems thereby ensuring that their performance indicators 
complied with the SMART principle, but in vain. What was also embedded in the 
systems problems was that the departmental action plans that were derived from the 
issues that were raised by the Provincial Internal Audit and the Audit-general were 
either irrelevant or not implementable. 
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The departmental management committees did not have confidence in the outcomes of 
their departmental M&E systems, and which is why such outcomes were deliberately 
overlooked during decision-making processes. The departmental management 
committees could not derive lessons from the outcomes of the M&E systems and this 
argument could be substantiated by the fact that deficiencies in performance indicators 
remained unresolved over the years. The support that the North West Provincial 
Treasury, the Office of the Premier, and the then Department of Performance, 
Monitoring and Evaluation provided for capacity building in the departmental M&E 
systems did not yield the desired outcomes mainly because the challenge of useless and 
unreliable performance information could not be addressed over the years.  
The Provincial Legislature did not exercise its legislative oversight role of holding the 
Members of Executive Councils (MECs) accountable for negative audit outcomes that 
could be attributed to deficiencies in performance indicators of their various portfolios. 
The MECs did not make their Accounting Officers answerable for such non-compliance 
with policy frameworks and prescripts that regulated performance information, and this 
culture was also prevalent between the Accounting Officers and their respective 
programme managers. Furore in data management processes was caused by the fact 
that the M&E function did not find expression in the performance agreement documents 
of programme managers, except those who were attached to their departmental M&E 
Directorates/Units. Ideally, programme managers are individually and collectively 
responsible for data management processes, but in this context the programme 
managers for M&E Directorates/Units were held accountable for the function. 
There was a culture of submitting monthly and quarterly performance information 
reports to the departmental M&E Directorates/Units without being quality assured by 
their respective programme managers, and this defeated the purpose of accountability 
in the public sector. M&E function was abdicated to the programme managers for the 
M&E Directorates/Units, and this had the potential of subjecting performance 
information reports to manipulation by the departmental M&E Directorates/Units that 
were under-resourced. In an ideal situation, programme managers should be appraised 
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based on the general performance of the department, and this implies that performance 
incentives should be granted to the provincial departments that get positive audit 
outcomes.  
5.5 Capacity of M&E 
Capacity (Maphunye, 2013: p18) can be understood as the ability of people, 
organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully. Both budget 
and human capital are critically important for any M&E systems to be functional. A 
monitoring and evaluation system does not operate in a vacuum, and therefore like any 
other internal management control system it requires internal and external support. 
“Accounting officers and authorities should view the Auditor-general, internal audit 
units, audit committees and the risk management function as important partners in 
fulfilling their legislated responsibilities” (Muchaonyerwa: 2014: p1). 
In 2013/14 financial year, the Auditor-general highlighted a trend of issues that 
hampered the North West provincial government departments from obtaining clean 
audit on performance information. Inadequate oversight role and poor leadership by the 
relevant structures were central to the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E 
systems in the provincial departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. 
Effective oversight role and adequate leadership by the relevant structures had the 
potential of improving internal management control systems, including the results-
based M&E system, as a measure to promote transparency and accountability in the 
provincial departments during the periods under review. M&E becomes important in 
helping an administration develop the predictive capacity (Kusek and Rist, 2004) 
necessary to better plan and implement its policies. 
The results of the thesis revealed that without a firm and competent institutional 
oversight structure and an effective leadership the internal management control 
systems, including the M&E systems, of the public sector will be compromised. The 
effectiveness of any organisational internal management control system revolves 
around the extent of weight that is exerted upon such systems by the relevant 
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institutional oversight structures and the magnitude of leadership skills. For instance, 
the departmental M&E systems were characterised by the capacity gaps and systems 
problems for years and this could be attributed to inadequate oversight role and poor 
leadership in the provincial government. It was found that both the executive and 
accounting authorities neglected their duties and responsibilities by not addressing 
performance information issues that were raised by the Auditor-general and the 
provincial internal audit over the years. Such authorities were never held accountable 
for failing to develop and implement audit action plans that were aimed at addressing 
deficiencies in their departmental annual reports. For instance, the provincial treasury 
should have played a critical role in ensuring that the departmental annual performance 
plans were aligned to the policy framework for managing programme performance 
information. The policy framework clarifies the criteria for good performance indicators 
and the role of performance information in planning, budgeting and reporting. On the 
other hand, the provincial legislature should have held the executive authorities 
answerable for performance information issues that were raised by the Auditor-general 
during the periods under review. Lastly, the executive authorities should have done 
likewise to their accounting authorities.   
The North West Provincial Legislature did not execute its Constitutional mandate of 
promoting transparency and accountability in the public sector, and this manifested 
itself in the form of repetitive no-compliance matters on performance information. 
Efforts made by the various portfolio committees in summoning the provincial 
departments to the Provincial Legislature pertaining to such non-compliance matters 
were futile because negative audit outcomes remained unaddressed over the years. On 
the other hand, the provincial treasury played a minimal role in capacitating the 
provincial departments in terms of the implementation of the framework for managing 
programme performance information. The provincial treasury’s intervention could not 
assist the provincial departments in their endeavour to address the capacity gaps and 
systems problems in their M&E systems. Little efforts were made to develop and 
implement action plans that were geared at pursue clean audit outcomes. 
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The study further revealed aspects such as the lack of M&E policies, lack of M&E skills,  
lack of quality assurance, and inadequate performance indicators as other capacity gaps 
and systems problems in the results-based M&E systems in the provincial departments. 
Such internal management control systems could have been long addressed had the 
institutional oversight structures exercised their oversight roles. There was a need for 
comprehensive turnaround and enhancement of internal management control systems, 
governance and oversight for the provincial government departments to attain clean 
audit on performance information. “Sustaining an M&E system  that can produce 
trustworthy, timely and relevant information on the performance of government, civil 
society or private sector projects, programmes and policies requires the overcoming of 
many M&E system challenges” (Gorgens and Kusek, 2009). 
The provincial departments acknowledged that they experienced the capacity gaps and 
systems problems in their M&E systems during the periods under review. The capacity 
gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems was compounded by the lack of 
approved M&E policies and shortage of M&E skilled personnel or the lack thereof. More 
than half of the departmental M&E Directorates/Units comprised of personnel who 
lacked the necessary qualifications and skills that are related to the M&E systems. M&E 
is a dynamic function that requires knowledge and experience in research, statistics, 
project management, graphs and tables. M&E trainings and workshops that were 
conducted in the departments were short-term in nature, and therefore they could not 
fully equip the officials with the necessary M&E skills. 
5.6 Participatory M&E System 
There are four core principles of participatory M&E (Estrella and Gaventa, 1997) and 
they include participation, learning, negotiation and flexibility. Literature emphasises 
that the results-based M&E system is participatory in nature considering that it is 
destined at unifying planning, budgeting and reporting. M&E must include participatory 
M&E to solicit views and opinions of key beneficiaries or citizens (Naidoo, 2011: p95).    
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The results of the thesis revealed that the North West provincial government 
departments had established ties with various M&E fora. For instance, they had 
representatives in the provincial internal audit, the provincial M&E forum, and the 
national M&E forum that was coordinated by the then department of performance, 
M&E. However, it was found that the technical support that was provided by such fora 
was inadequate considering the fact that the capacity gaps and systems problems in the 
M&E systems in the provincial departments remained unresolved during the periods 
under review.  
Reasoning does not stand apart from experience that workshops, including M&E 
workshops, are often poorly coordinated and conducted to such an extent that they 
could be reduced to the level of talk-shows. It could be interpreted that the workshops 
that were conducted by the M&E fora were ineffective or their technical guidance and 
advice on the M&E systems were poor implemented at the departmental level. 
Possibilities are that the M&E workshops were attended for leisure purposes or 
information derived from such workshops was not cascaded down in the departments 
for capacity building purposes. Government officials have tendency of not providing 
feedback on trainings or workshops that they have attended and this has the potential 
of stifling capacity building in the M&E systems. 
The participation of all key stakeholders supporting M&E (Dumela, 2013: p94) related 
activities is critical to ensure buy-in of the process. The study revealed that there was 
inadequate oversight role that was played by the relevant structures in ensuring that 
the provincial departments were capacitated in terms of the implementation and 
management of the M&E system. It was required of the executive authorities to 
mobilise both financial and human capital resources as an attempt to sharpen their 
departmental M&E systems, but in vain. Documentary analysis found that the executive 
authorities did not attend special meetings that were convened by the Auditor-general 
regarding matters that warranted their immediate attention. They could have 
encouraged their departments to benchmark with other provinces or countries that had 
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the best model for the results-based M&E system as a measure to capacitate their own 
systems. 
It was found that the departmental programme managers participated passively in the 
value chain of the results-based M&E systems mainly because they submitted 
performance information reports without being quality assured. They were not hands-
on on the roll-out process of the departmental action plans that were derived from 
performance information issues that were raised by the provincial internal audit and the 
Auditor-general during the periods under review. Focusing on human capacity (Gorgens 
and Kusek, 2009:  p94) for M&E will improve the quality of the M&E system. 
 
The disbandment of the North West Provincial Executive Committee of the ANC in 2009 
impacted negatively on the general administration of the province. The provincial 
departments struggled to implement their internal management control systems, 
including the M&E systems, and this could be attributed to political interference. For 
instance, the North West Provincial Legislature did not exercise its oversight role freely 
and fairly mainly because the Portfolio Committees avoided exposing the departments 
that performed poorly considering that this will exacerbate political tension in the 
province. For instance, the provincial departments were not held accountable for non-
compliance matters that were raised by the Auditor-general during the periods under 
review and this could be attributed to political tension in the province.. 
 
5.7 Transparency and accountability 
It is enshrined in the Constitution of the country that accountability and transparency 
should prevail in the public sector. Leaders and officials that deliberately or negligently 
ignore their duties and disobey legislation should be decisively dealt with through 
performance management and by enforcing the legislated consequences for 
transgressions (Nombemebe, 2013: p11). 
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M&E partnerships increase and improve communication, participation and shared 
accountability (Gorgens and Kusek, 2009) among stakeholders involved in M&E. The 
study revealed that during the period under review it was only the Office of the Premier 
that possessed an electronic M&E system that compelled all programme managers to 
account for their submitted performance information. In other provincial departments 
the process of quality assurance on performance information was entirely the 
responsibility of the programme managers who manned the M&E Directorates/Units. 
Such provincial departments lacked measures that could be applied to address issues 
that were related to poor quality of accountability reports. There were tendencies of 
developing and submitting the departmental action plans that lacked substance and 
that were not implementable knowingly that the implementation of such plans were not 
monitored. 
 
The rationale behind presenting the annual performance plans and budgets in the 
provincial legislatures is to promote accountability and transparency in the public sector. 
This process ideally gives the provincial departments powers to implement their 
approved plans within the limits of the approved budget allocated. The study revealed 
that on annual basis public expenditure was greater than the total number of actual 
performance targets achieved, and that could be ascribed to inadequate oversight role 
and poor leadership. Public officials were not held accountable for deviating from the 
approved annual performance plans and budget and that had the potential of defeating 
the objective of Operation Clean Audit 2014. Leaders and officials that deliberately or 
negligently ignore their duties and disobey legislation should be decisively dealt with 
through performance management and by enforcing the legislated consequences for 
transgressions (Nombemebe, 2013: p11). 
 
M&E systems are meant to increase accountability, transparency, participation and the 
ability to hold people to performance plans as outcomes of the system itself.  This is a 
high ideal, and the foundation stone of M&E systems, particularly in the public sector.  
What an M&E system cannot do, however, is to force the achievement of its own 
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outcomes where there is inadequate oversight of the system itself, which includes real 
and substantive penalties for non-compliance of the technical requirements of the 
system, and non-compliance on the part of the overseers themselves.  Oversight is 
largely the responsibility of the politicians through the oversight committees, as well as 
the auditor general – if there is insufficient will and capacity in the oversight role, it is 
unlikely that the system will work. The political wrangling that has been a feature of the 
North West province in recent years may well have contributed to the lack of 
substantive performance in terms of M&E implementation and performance in the 
province.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
The study investigated the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in 
the North West provincial government departments between 2010/11 and 2013/14 
financial years. It was triggered by the fact that the provincial departments were 
plagued with negative audit opinion on performance information during the periods 
under review. The findings of the thesis revealed that the departmental M&E systems 
were characterised by factors such as inadequate oversight role, poor leadership, lack 
of accountability, lack of M&E skills, and inadequate internal management controls. 
6.2 Conclusion and recommendations 
This section addresses both the primary and secondary research questions thereby 
submitting recommendations that could be applied to remedy the capacity gaps and 
systems problems in the M&E systems in the North West provincial government 
departments.  
6.2.1 Compliance with policy frameworks and prescripts 
The findings of the study revealed that inadequate oversight role and poor leadership 
by the relevant structures were at the core of the capacity gaps and systems problems 
in the M&E systems in the North West provincial government departments between 
2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years. It was also found that certain departmental M&E 
policies were unapproved and others were ineffective and that resulted into negative 
audit opinion on performance information during the periods under review. Negative 
audit opinion implied that performance information that the provincial departments 
submitted to the relevant institutional oversight structures, for accountability purposes, 
did not comply with policy frameworks and prescripts that regulated the M&E systems. 
The researcher submits the following recommendations to remedy the situation: 
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Inadequate oversight role: The North West Provincial Legislature should be 
capacitated as a measure to intensify its legislative oversight role of holding the 
Executive Authorities accountable for performance information issues that were raised 
by the Auditor-general. 
Poor leadership: The Office of the Premier is the champion of the provincial M&E 
system, and therefore the office should take leadership in terms of ensuring that the 
provincial departments develop and submit annual performance plans that meet the 
requirements of SMART principles (specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and time-
bound). 
Draft/ineffective M&E policies: The Office of the Premier and the Provincial 
Treasury obtained clean audit reports in 2012/13 and 2013/14 respectively, and 
therefore they should play a critical role in assisting the provincial departments to 
finalise their drafts or review their M&E policies.  
6.2.2 Institutionalisation of M&E systems 
It was found that there was lack of uniformity regarding how M&E Directorates/Units 
were structured and located in the provincial departments. For instance, the M&E 
Directorates/Units were reporting to the Programme Managers or directly to the 
Accounting Authorities, and in some instances certain provincial departments lacked 
dedicated M&E Directorates/Units. The study further revealed that programme 
managers distanced themselves from the quality assurance process, and therefore such 
responsibility was shifted to programme managers who were directly attached to the 
M&E Directorates/Units. Lastly, the M&E systems were characterised by lack of M&E 
skills and inadequate budget. The following options could be applied to address the 
above identified gaps: 
 Lack of uniformity in M&E structure and location: Office of the Premier should 
take a lead in the process of streamlining the M&E in the provincial departments. 
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Lack of quality assurance on performance information: M&E function should be 
incorporated in performance agreements of all programme managers as a measure to 
enhance accountability. 
Lack of M&E skills: The Office of the Premier should have a centralised budget that 
could be utilised create a pool of M&E graduates and also to up-skill the incumbent 
officials who are attached to the departmental M&E Directorates/Units. 
Inadequate budget: The electronic M&E system that is applied by the Office of the 
Premier should be rolled-out to all provincial departments and therefore adequate 
budget should be set aside for this process. 
6.2.3 Context and purpose of M&E system  
The findings of the study revealed that the performance indicators that were developed 
and applied by the provincial departments were not aligned to the SMART principles, 
and therefore performance information that was generated through the M&E systems 
was useless and unreliable. Such information could not assist during the departmental 
decision-making processes. The departmental action plans that were derived from 
performance information issues that were raised by the Provincial Internal Audit and the 
Auditor-general were irrelevant, not implementable and were not monitored. 
Inadequate performance indicators: Office of the Premier, the Provincial Treasury, 
and the Department of Planning, M&E should coordinate the process of capacitating the 
provincial departments in terms of reviewing their performance indicators.  
Inadequate action plans: The provincial departments should apply a dashboard 
approach to monitor the implementation of action plans, and programme managers 
should be held accountable for such plans. 
6.2.4 Capacity of the M&E system 
The results of the thesis indicated that the crux of capacity gaps and systems problems 
in the M&E systems in the provincial departments were inadequate oversight role and 
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poor leadership. Vacuum in oversight role and leadership impacted negatively on the 
entire internal management control systems ranging from policies, human capital, 
quality of accountability reports, and above them all accountability element. 
Inadequate oversight role and poor leadership: The Office of the Premier, the 
Provincial Treasury, and the Department of Planning, M&E should improve the 
assistance and guidance they provide to the provincial departments regarding the M&E 
systems. 
Quality of accountability reports: The M&E function should be incorporated in 
performance agreements of all programme managers. This will compel all programme 
managers to provide assurance on the credibility and reliability of performance 
information reports they submit to the M&E Directorates/Units. 
6.2.5 Participatory M&E 
The study revealed that there was prevalence of minimal oversight pertaining to 
performance information matters that were raised by the Provincial Internal Audit, the 
Auditor-general, and the then Department of Performance, M&E. Documentary analysis 
also revealed that certain Executive Authorities did not attend special meetings that 
were convened by the Auditor-general for the purpose of highlighting issues that 
required their immediate intervention. The findings of the study indicated that a very 
small number of programme managers, accounting officers and executive authorities 
provided limited assurance or no assurance towards the improvement of the provincial 
audit outcome for 2013/14 financial year. Lastly, it was found that the provincial 
departments participated in various M&E fora, but such a platform yielded minimum 
results. It is recommended that the following actions be taken to turn around the 
situation: 
 
Inadequate oversight role: Members of the executive council should be actively 
involved in the processes of addressing performance information issues that are raised 
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by the Provincial Internal Audit, the Auditor-general, and the Department of Planning, 
M&E. 
Passive participation in M&E function: Accounting officers and programme 
managers should play a pivotal role in the value chain process regarding performance 
information. They should ensure that such information is useful and reliable for 
decision-making processes. 
M&E fora: The Office of the Premier should establish collaboration with institutions of 
higher learning and foreign countries that have the best M&E model. 
 
6.2.6 Transparency and accountability 
 
The results of the study revealed that stringent measures were not applied to hold the 
executive authorities, accounting officers, and programme managers accountable for 
the general poor performance of their respective provincial departments. It was also 
found that there was disjuncture between the public expenditure and the actual 
performance targets over the years. It was like a norm for the public expenditure to be 
greater than the actual service delivery. The researcher submits the following 
recommendations to improve the situation in the provincial departments: 
Lack of accountability: M&E function should form part of performance agreement of 
the executive authorities, accounting officers, and all programme managers. 
Lack of transparency: The departmental performance information reports should, 
including annual reports, should be posted on the government website. 
6.3 Recommendations for the enhancement of this research report 
The researcher recommends that the following M&E aspects should be investigated as a 
measure to beef up this research report: 
 What is the state of M&E readiness in the North West municipalities? 
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 Which strategies could the North West provincial government apply to enhance 
oversight role and accountability in the M&E system? 
6.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the capacity gaps and systems 
problems in the M&E system in the North West provincial government departments. 
 
And asked the question “What capacity gaps and systems problem in the monitoring 
and evaluation systems caused the majority of North West provincial government 
departments to receive qualified opinions on non-financial performance between the 
2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years?”  
 
This was in response to a context of the capacity gaps and systems problems in the 
M&E systems in the North West province. 
 
The literature review presented literature from the M&E systems which resulted into 
sub-themes for analysis. 
The methodology used was qualitative, using interviews and documentary analysis 
research designs.  Sampling was purposive in nature 
The data showed that the capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems in 
the North West provincial government departments were as the result of inadequate 
oversight role and poor leadership in the province. 
In answer to the research question which was “What capacity gaps and systems 
problem in the monitoring and evaluation systems caused the majority of North West 
provincial government departments to receive qualified opinions on non-financial 
performance between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years?” 
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The research found that a political will is critical for promoting capacity building in the 
institutional oversight structures and the provincial leadership. 
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Appendix A 
Internal Questionnaire for administration in the North West provincial government 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A questionnaire for research on the Capacity of M&E Systems in North West Provincial Government Departments, 
2014. The researcher will administer this questionnaire. 
Surname & Initials of the Interviewee  
Designation of the Interviewee  
Contact Details of the Interviewee  
Physical address  
Time of the Interview  
Date of the Interview  
EMPLOYER/ORGANISATION DETAILS 
Office of the Premier  Department of Public Works, Roads & Transport   
Department of Sport, Arts & Culture  Department of Health  
Provincial Treasury  Department of Social Development  
 
                                                                               QUESTIONS 
1. INSTITUTIONALISED M&E SYSTEMS 
1.1 Under which directorate is your departmental Monitoring & Evaluation Unit located/placed?  
 
 
 
1.2 Is there an approved M&E Policy in your department? If no, please tell me the reasons why. If yes, could you 
share a copy with me? 
 
 
 
1.3 Discuss in detail the major problems faced by the departmental M&E Unit in terms of availability of resources.     
 
 
 
2. PURPOSE OF M&E SYSTEM 
2.1 Does the Departmental Management Committee value the outcomes of the M&E Unit/system for decision-
making processes?? Please elaborate further on this matter. 
 
 
 
2.2 To what extent has the M&E Unit/system improved non-financial performance of the department between 
2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years? 
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3. PARTICIPATORY M&E SYSTEM 
3.1 How does the North West Provincial Executive Council exercise its oversight role in the implementation 
process of the M&E Unit/system?  
 
 
 
3.2 Is your department linked to any structure/forum that is relevant to Monitoring & Evaluation system? How 
has the departmental M&E Unit benefited from such structure/forum? 
 
 
 
4. TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY 
4.1 Who, in terms of seniority, is responsible for ensuring quality assurance during data management processes? 
Please substantiate your answer. 
 
 
 
4.2 Do programme managers provide reasons for their under-performance or over-performance on a monthly 
basis? 
 
 
 
4.3 Is M&E function incorporated in job descriptions of managers who are involved in data management 
processes? 
 
 
 
4.4 Which measures are in place for dealing with cases of under-performance and over-performance in terms of 
the set departmental targets? 
 
 
 
5. CAPACITY IN M&E 
5.1 What capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems caused the department to receive qualified 
opinions on non-financial performance between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years? 
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Appendix B 
External Questionnaire for performance auditing structures 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A questionnaire for research on the Capacity of M&E Systems in North West Provincial Government Departments, 
2014. The researcher will administer this questionnaire. 
 
Surname & Initials of the Interviewee  
Designation of the Interviewee  
Contact Details of the Interviewee  
Physical address  
Time of the Interview  
Date of the Interview  
EMPLOYER/ORGANISATION DETAILS 
Auditor-general of South Africa  
National Department of Performance, Monitoring & Evaluation  
North West Provincial Internal Audit  
                                                                           QUESTIONS 
1. COMPLIANCE TO PRESCRIPTS/POLICIES 
1.1 Do all the North West provincial government departments have their own M&E Units and the approved M&E 
policies in place?  
 
 
 
 
1.2 Do the departments submit their monthly/quarterly/annual reports within the set statutory dates for audit 
purposes? 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Between 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years, where there cases of non-compliance that were reported 
regarding non-financial performance by the North West provincial government departments? And what led to 
such cases? 
 
 
 
 
 
2. PURPOSE OF M&E SYSTEM 
2.1 To what extent has the M&E Unit/system improved non-financial performance of the North West provincial 
government departments during the years under review? Please elaborate. 
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3. PARTICIPATORY M&E SYSTEM 
3.1 To what degree did the North West Provincial Executive Council intervene in the process of addressing non-
compliance issues that are related to non-financial performance information that were raised during the periods 
under review? Please substantiate your answer. 
 
 
 
 
4. TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY 
4.1 Do the departments produce non-financial performance reports that could be equated to the public money 
spent (value for money)? And give reasons to support your argument.  
 
 
 
 
4.2 Do the departments have systems in place for dealing with incidents of under-performance or over-
performance regarding the roll-out of their annual performance plans? 
 
 
 
 
5. CAPACITY IN M&E 
5.1 What capacity gaps and systems problems in the M&E systems caused the departments to receive qualified 
opinions on non-financial performance between the 2010/11 and 2013/14 financial years? 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Which interventions could the North West provincial government departments apply to improve their audit 
reports pertaining to non-financial performance? 
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Appendix C 
Interview Schedule 
Initials & 
Surname  
Organization Designation Date Status of 
Appointm
ent 
Slots Place 
                                                                  Internal Interviews 
Mr. T. Siwelela Office of the Premier Senior Manager: 
M&E 
1 Dec. 14 Done 45 minutes Mahikeng 
Dr. F. Reichel Department of Health Senior 
Manager:Policy, 
Planning, M&E 
2 Dec. 14 Done 45 minutes Mahikeng 
Dr. K. Lesedi Department of Sport, Arts & 
Culture 
Senior Manager: 
M&E 
12 Jan. 15 Done 45 minutes Mahikeng 
Ms. H. Pretorius Department of Public Works, 
Roads & Transport  
Senior Manager: 
Strategic 
Management 
16 Jan. 15 Done 45 minutes Mahikeng 
Mr. M. Mahlabe Department of Agriculture & 
Rural Development 
Senior Manager: 
M&E 
27 Jan. 15 Confirmed 45 minutes Mahikeng 
Mr. G. Letlhogile Provincial Treasury Senior Manager: 
M&E 
20 Jan. 15 Confirmed 45 minutes Mahikeng 
 
Mr. J. Denton Auditor-general of South Africa 
(AGSA) 
Audit Manager 17 Dec. 
14 
Done 45 minutes Rustenburg 
Ms. P. Kole Department of Performance, 
Monitoring & Evaluation 
Senior Manager: 
M&E 
4 Dec. 14 Done 45 minutes Pretoria 
Mr. A. Nel North West Provincial Internal 
Audit 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
1 Dec. 14 Done 45 minutes Mahikeng 
 
